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Writing is one of the most painful activities known to mankind. I learnt this in the period 
of 2006-2009 as I struggled to form coherent sentences for the thesis you now hold in 
your hands, a protracted process no words could ever describe adequately. People with 
similar predicaments often look back and wonder about the miracles that they have been 
bestowed upon to survive the ordeals of writing. Luck and divine interventions are 
common explanatory variables. But I believe Émile Durkheim‟s wisdom that anomie is a 
socially curable condition came at an opportune moment, and so I turned to the people 
around me as my life buoy in these times. Here I pay homage to these lifesavers around 
me, even if the activity of writing can often be an isolating experience.  
First and foremost, I think Daniel Goh has redefined what it means to be a 
supervisor in the National University of Singapore. I am deeply indebted to his friendship 
and close guidance (especially during those mind-boggling lunches where he would grill 
me with questions on the sociological classics), and also his detachment for me to pursue 
my own intellectual distractions during my candidature. I will also remember Daniel for 
being the only professor who would literally chase me for late work, running after me on 
one occasion when I tried to avoid him, and planting messengers in my social circle as 
reminders of my looming deadlines. If anything, his most important lesson to me was to 
sublimate personal issues into academic writing and to practice a technology of the self to 
surmount my problems. I have the counsel of Daniel to thank for, if I consider myself to 
have survived this trying period largely unscathed. 
Standing beside Daniel are other pillars of strength like Anne Raffin and Leong 
Wai Teng, who have taught me many things not only as academic mentors but also as 
seasoned veterans of life. The transition from teacher-student relationship to eventually 
friendship took some getting used to, but it proved to be so gratifying to learn that your 
mentors are also people with a similar set of issues facing them in life. Anne‟s courage 
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and generosity as a mother has been an inspiration for the department, and I wish the best 
for her and Lucie. As one of the most misunderstood teachers in the department, Wai 
Teng‟s patience and wit have been under-appreciated by many undergraduates. If I have 
been a good teaching assistant to many students, I believe it was only because much of 
Wai Teng‟s pedagogical philosophy has rubbed off on me. Besides them, the friendship 
of professors Ananda Rajah, Chua Beng Huat, Vedi Hadiz, Hing Ai Yun and Ho Kong 
Chong have also proved to be key motivators to me, especially in reminding me that the 
less-taken path of academia is a worthwhile one. 
Graduate life would have been impossible had it not involved people who are 
equally committed to academic production and enjoyment. My roommates Justin Lee and 
Cheryl Tan are exemplars of this maxim and I miss the time we‟ve spent at AS1 #03-27, 
a private bubble of discussions on varied topics ranging from boyfriends to Bourdieu. 
This is not forgetting the entire bunch of graduate students who cram themselves into that 
sorry excuse of a “graduate room”, especially the regular fixtures like Eugene Liow, 
Daniel Tham, Sheela Cheong, Thomas Barker, Seuty Sabur, Audrey Verma, Johan Suen, 
Melissa Sim, Lou Janssen Dangzalan, Lim Weida, Siti Nuraidah, Siti Shafaa, Nadia 
Abdullah, Adlina Maulod, Nurhaizatu Jamil, Alvin Tay, Sarbeswar Sahoo, Chand 
Somaiah, Nurul Huda, Mamta Sachan Kumar, Xu Minghua and Anil Singh Sona. Not to 
forget the support and assistance rendered by the administrative staff, where KS Raja, 
Chia Choon Lan, Jameelah Bte Mohamed, Brenda Lim, Cecelia Sham, Tham Chuey 
Peng, Shirley Chua and Jane Ong, who made my liminal role as staff and student a much 
tolerable subject-position than I had initially imagined. 
As an ethnographic study, this thesis would have been impossible without the 
assistance from members of Singapore‟s NGO community, who had welcomed this 
budding activist into their midst in early 2008. From Transient Workers Count Too 
(TWC2), they are John Gee, Imran Price, Russell Heng, Noor Abdul Rahman, Wang Eng 
Eng, Sha Najak, Shelley Thio, Debbie Fordyce, Margaret Thomas, Caroline Lim, 
Maureen Donelly and Malini Xavier. From the Humanitarian Organization for Migration 
Economics (HOME), I would like to thank Bridget Lew, Jolovan Wham and Charanpal 
Bal Singh. Others include Alvin Tan from The Necessary Stage, who spoke passionately 
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about local politics and forum theatre; Shaun Teo and Susy Bungsu from Migrant Voices; 
Eva Nurifah and Ummai Umairoh from the Indonesian Family Network (IFN); 
Constance Singam and Caris Lim from the Association of Women for Action and 
Research (AWARE); Sinapan Samydorai from The Think Centre; Braema Mathi from 
MARUAH; and independent filmmaker Martyn See, who incidentally shared his first 
protest march experience with me while in Malaysia. Last but not least, the tireless duo of 
Stephanie Chok and Patrick Chng have demonstrated how human compassion through 
activism is possible despite the blasé political environment of Singapore.  
Over at Kuala Lumpur, Alice Nah has been a key figure during my visits in 2007 
not only in her generosity in offering accommodation, but also for her intellectual 
discussions on human rights and her embedment within the refugee NGOs of Malaysia, 
which had opened a lot of doors for me. Through Alice, I have had the opportunity to 
meet other activists such as Irene and Aegile Fernandez of Tenaganita; Cynthia Gabriel 
of Coordination of Action Research on AIDS & Mobility (CARAM Asia); John Liu and 
Wong Chai Yee of Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM); Jerald Joseph and Mien Ly of 
Pusat KOMAS; Malik Imtiaz Sarwar of the National Human Rights Society (HAKAM); 
the late Toni Kassim; Chua Yee Ling of Youth 4 Change; Pang Khee Teik of The Annex 
Gallery; and Kerina Francis of Women‟s Aid Organization (WAO). Above all, it was the 
patience and generosity of Associate Professor Saliha Hassan of University Kebangsaan 
Malaysia (UKM), who had assisted me in obtaining a Malaysian research permit from the 
Economic Planning Unit of the Malaysian Prime Minister‟s Office. 
 Lastly, I offer thanks to my mother for her silent and unyielding support on those 
days when everything seemed impossible. If anyone were to ask me about the 
contributions made by this thesis, if any, I think I can safely say that its biggest 
contribution is that I can finally move on with my life. 




In multicultural Malaysia and Singapore, where ethnic markers persist as categories of 
governance, the plight of abused foreign domestic workers is still conditioned by racial 
notions of humanity and sub-humanity. Furthermore, the state‟s hegemonic imperative to 
secure middle-class entitlements depends on the influx of cheap foreign others, and thus 
the regulation of foriegn bodies - via differentiated citizenship regimes that attach value 
according to skills, gender and ethno-race - is necessary for the reproduction of class 
privileges for the electorate. Into this nexus of situated power and ethics, civil society 
groups campaigning for a legislated day-off for domestic workers introduce a debate on 
their plight and articulate claims for their dignity. As case studies of how civil society 
activism may develop differently despite a shared colonial history, the divergent styles of 
the day-off campaigns of Malaysia‟s Tenaganita and Singapore‟s Transient Workers 
Count Too present new directions on the well examined topics of political agency, civil 
society and human rights in both countries. 
 
This study has two objectives. Firstly, I discuss how nationalist discourses on 
development have structured the institution of domestic service in both countries. In 
reorganizing the family and the economic role of women, the developmental mission of 
Malaysia and Singapore induces the labour participation of women while maintaining 
conceptions of housework as feminine labour. In facilitating the influx of foreign women 
as replacement labour without comprehensive legal protection, the state tacitly subjects 
the worker to a regime that ranks her according to her identity marker as „manual labour,‟ 
„female‟ and „ethno-racial alien‟. Secondly, I illustrate how civil society interventions 
into this current configuration of domestic work have to address specific questions on 
entitlements of non-citizens, gender equality and human rights in the respective national 
contexts.  In Singapore, where material stakeholding and multiracialism have displaced 
rights claims as „anti-national,‟ advocacy groups operate instead through extra-legal 
ethical interventions and training to improve the domestic worker‟s market position. In 
contrast, where elite factionalism and ethnic policies in Malaysia continually place 
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identity claims at the forefront of political contention, groups still leverage upon rights 
claims for the protection of new migrants.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 






With the rise of the deterritorializing forces of migration and economic globalization that 
unsettle the political and spatial borders of the nation-state, the question of „migrant 
rights‟ raises questions about citizenship and national sovereignty.  Where unified models 
of citizenship previously erect a binary between the citizenship rights as premised on 
national membership and the „stateless‟ condition as a position external to the nation-
state, emerging conditions call for a rethink of some of these theoretical traditions.
1
 For 
one, the politico-legal assumption that only the nation-state can secure citizenship 
protection and entitlements is increasingly disrupted by the observation that non-citizens 
can accumulate partial and “flexible” rights during cross-border processes.2 A disruption 
to this conceptualization of citizenship occurs where the invocation of rights by 
international and regional migrant groups now hold nation-states accountable for the 
protection of transnational bodies as persons in themselves or as citizens of other nation-
states.  
 
                                                 
1 Writing in the early twentieth century, T.H. Marshall recognizes that the formal equality attached to 
citizenship as a legal status rarely embodies the manifestation of substantive equality in social terms. As 
such, the Marshallian concept of “social rights” highlights the need to extend protection to vulnerable 
segments of the nation against the boundaries of ethno-race, class and gender that undercuts their 
standing as equal citizens. However, this approach problematically assumes that the nation-state is able 
to control and manage a population confined to a fixed national territory. Similarly, Talal Asad (2000, 
para 11) argues that “Human rights depend, it has been said, on national rights. States are essential to the 
protection they offer. This means that states can and do use human rights discourse against their citizens - 
as colonial empires used it against their subjects - to realize their civilizing project.” 
2
 Ong, 1999. 
  
2 
On the other hand, rather than a complete dissolution of national sovereignty, 
transnational flows have also strengthened other activities of the nation-state, especially 
in the creation of new citizenship regimes for governance.
3
 Witness for instance, the 
inclusion of foreigners on the terms of economic instrumentality. Where skills have now 
become the new currency of entitlements, an emerging transnational class of knowledge 
workers now plies the migratory channels of Asia, enjoying citizenship-like benefits but 
without a social contract with their host states.
4
 Separately, the influx of blue-collar 
migrants is also engineered, but this group does not enjoy similar rights because of their 
„unskilled‟ status. Especially where the „dirty, demeaning and dangerous‟ jobs continue 
to support the developmental aspirations of Asia‟s tiger economies, the inflow of this 
group is encouraged, but only as highly-regulated, transient labour that can be easily 
rotated out when market demand dips. Into the nexus of state sovereignty and citizenship 
regimes described above, the plight of foreign domestic workers (hereafter FDWs) in 
Malaysia and Singapore exposes the intersection of such inclusionary and exclusionary 
politics as global forces interact with local conditions. More specifically, the problem of 
„maid abuse‟ brings into stark relief, the processes by which universalistic rights are 
played out in a particularistic and localized context for the protection/repudiation of these 
vulnerable women. 
 Since the 1970s, low wage labour migration has become a long term policy 
response of sending states to battle unemployment and declining resources for social 
                                                 
3
 See, for instance, Sassen, 1996: 1-30. 
4
 Ong (2006: 181-6) has argued that many of these „knowledge workers‟ are wooed into Singapore for its 
“technopreneurial network” of laboratories, universities and high-tech companies under promises of local 
citizenship, attractive remuneration packages and generous scholarships. Increasingly, a sizable number 
of them arrive from Mainland China, who besides their requisite skills and qualifications, also possess 
the „preferred‟ ethnicity. 
  
3 
welfare programs. Concomintantly, the inflow of remittances supports the foreign 
exchange earnings of sending states and migrant returnees is expected to contribute 
eventually to modernization by practicing skills learnt overseas. At the host countries, the 
immigration of female servants is a reactive solution to electoral pressures from the 
middle classes, with regards to childcare services as the labour force undergoes 
restructuring. Yet, as domestic work is considered „unskilled‟, a perception compounded 
by the influx of foreign women from different racial-ethnic groups, legal protection of 
FDWs does not rank high among the priorities of receiving countries. 
The presence and quality of life of Fillipino, Indoensian and South Asian FDWs 
throughout Southeast Asia has been well documented by recent interest in the subject. 
Thus far, research has ranged from the relationship between the international division of 
labour and the transnaitonalization of domestic work, to the persistent absence of rights 
for FDWs within the host countries. Within the latter, there has been an emerging trend 
of extending the legal rights associated with citizenship to immigrants and their 
descendants in western liberal democracies.
5
 Proponents typically highlight equal 
citizenship as a way of securing the basic interests and needs of immigrants. Political 
theorist Joseph Carens has highlighted the obligation of nation-states towards resident 
foreign workers, because their “long term membership in civil society creates a moral 
entitlement to the legal rights of membership, including citizenship itself.”6 Following 
Charles Taylor‟s formulation of multiculturalism as a “politics of recognition”, many 
believe that genuine cultural inclusion is possible when it is premised on a respect for 
individual dignity and the difference of others, in turn arguing for the public recognition 
                                                 
5
 See Weil, 2001: 32-33 for a comparison of twenty five nationality laws across the world.  
  
4 
of equal worth across various collective identities.
7
 Will Kymlicka‟s work on 
multicultural rights similarly threads this path in arguing that social justice requires equal 
recognition of different ethno-cultural groups within the same state, and that this should 
be extended to long term migrant populations.
8
  
However, as a question of resource allocation between different cultural 
collectives, the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights for one group within a 
nation-state may come at the expense of another, despite the ideal of rights as universal. 
In reality, where the political language of rights has been successfully used by some 
international non-governmental organizations (hereafter NGOs) in securing the 
entitlements of migrants, local NGOs often have to strategize around constraints (such as 
„Asian Values‟) on how best to extend their humanitarian goals. This is especially so in 
the context of some Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia and Singapore, where rights 
talk can be more of an impediment than an enabler, given the conservative political 
environment that are suspicious of rights as articulations of Western imperialism.
9
 On the 
other hand, the question of citizenship is of less importance for FDWs than their labour 
rights, partly due to their common experience of unpaid wages, lack of day-offs and their 
transient nature as temporary workers. Yet despite these problems, it is in this context of 
inequalities in access to citizenship status and rising incidence of temporary and return 
migration, that a call for a “transnational approach to migrant rights” has been made.10 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
6
 Carens quoted in Bell, 2006: 282. 
7
 Taylor, 1994,: 37-9. 
8
 Kymlicka, 2005: 129. 
9
 Chua (2000; 2003) has written extensively on the constrained civil society and the limitations on liberal 
rights in the context of Singapore. For a comparison between Malaysia and Singapore‟s approach to the 
question of human rights activism by civil society, see Rodan, 2009. 
10
 Piper 2008: 290. 
  
5 
This thesis offers an analysis of the attempts by two NGOs in Malaysia and 
Singapore in addressing some of these complexities surrounding rights as they search for 
the best way to campaign for the interests of FDWs. The countries‟ resistance to rights 
talk has been well documented and it provides a chance to explore and evaluate the 
different strategies of enacting rights claims within illiberal polities. Furthermore, as 
Malaysia and Singapore views FDWs as a transient, unskilled labour force occupying an 
almost invisible position within the legal-politico terrain, these women are caught in a 
liminal position without access to many liberties. Under these circumstances, how would 
NGOs convince other citizens that the immigrants should have equal access to resources 
on the terms of rights? Would these groups persist with the notion of universal rights, or 
would they turn to extra-legal interventions so that the moral protection of FDWs may be 
achieved in lieu of legal safeguards? What are the payoffs and risks in reconfiguring 
rights discourses to adjust to local political contingencies? Preliminarily, the data 
presented do suggest that pro-migrant NGOs in both countries are keen to adopt the 
language of universal human rights and make reference to international labour and 
humanitarian standards in their work. However, despite the value of such tools, the 
recourse to rights is not always a clear and easy choice for NGOs. Rather than dismiss 
these groups because the commitment to rights is not always pursued or articulated, the 
thesis argues that a more nuanced evaluation of NGO efforts needs to delineate the 
typical constraints and dilemmas they face in their attempts to achieve their aims. 
My arguments are supported by my ethnographic discussion of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) that work with foreign domestic workers (FDWs); Tenaganita in 
Peninsular Malaysia and Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2) in Singapore. My 
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selection of the groups was informed by their prominence as key NGOs that work on 
migrant labour issues at the time. For two years (late 2006 - early 2009), I carried out 
extensive fieldwork amongst a group of individuals who generously pooled their time and 
resources to render direct social services such as help lines, skills training and 
enhancement, case management and organizing public campaigns for the rights of 
migrant workers. In Singapore, I participated in the TWC2‟s internal meetings and closed 
door sessions with governmental bodies, interviewed key members, answered helpline 
calls, observed skills training classes conducted for the migrant workers, took part in 
cultural activities organised by FDWs and construction workers. I spoke with five 
employers and two employment agents to get at their perceptions of FDWs. Notably, the 
enlarged public presence of TWC2 and its partner organizations marked the first time in 
Singapore‟s history where such a large number of citizens have mobilized on behalf of 
non-citizens, thereby expanding the historically national-oriented character of civil 
society movements to a transnational one. 
Turning to Malaysia for a comparative dimension, Tenaganita becomes an 
obvious choice for several reasons. Under the leadership of Irene and Aegile Fernandez, 
Tenaganita has emerged as Malaysia‟s foremost organization on migrant issues in the 
past fifteen years. Like TWC2, Tenaganita is concerned with migrant labour issues from 
a rights-based perspective and has a series of initiatives towards these humanitarian 
goals. Although it shares with TWC2 the element of service provision and closed-door 
lobbying, Tenaganita differs significantly in its willingness to draw upon international 
rights instruments to openly hold the Malaysian state accountable. Especially where 
Malaysia‟s own human rights rhetoric has backfired on its political elite, Tenaganita has 
  
7 
also used the state-propagated accountability platforms to varying degrees of success for 
reforms. To make these assessments, I attended keynote presentations by Irene and 
Aegile Fernandez of Tenaganita, observed a closed door discussion on migration 
organized by a group of Malaysian NGOs (including Tenganita), and attended 
presentations by state officials from Malaysia‟s Immigration Department.  
I attend to the formal presentation of both groups‟ activities, and to the „hidden 
transcripts‟ through which activism is adjusted to respond to contingencies and reversals. 
Specifically, I examine the tensions in the legal-technical domain, where uneasy 
collaborations take place between state and civil society on instrumental grounds, and the 
simultaneously disciplined and empowered positions of FDWs who are at the receiving 
end of these collaborations. The NGO practices and collaborations with the state include: 
(a) reframing dominant discourses and rhetoric so that the protection of FDWs may be re-
included into governmental policies, and (b) counselling and training the FDWs to 
elevate their position as empowered economic agents. Looking at how NGOs employ and 
refigure rights discourses can tell us many things about the contingent nature of a rights-
based approach to migration across both countries. As case studies of how civil society 
organizations may develop differently despite a common colonial history, Tenaganita‟s 
comparatively aggressive rights-based approach to state engagement vis à vis TWC2‟s 
technical partnership form analytical mirrors that reflect back on the structure of cultural 





The Concept of Civil Society 
With the resurgence of „civil society‟ as a popular analytical register in the nineties, 
contemporary scholarship has favoured a liberal perspective in studying the relatively 
impoverished political conditions for social mobilization. In viewing the state and civil 
society as distinctively separate spheres, some observers have argued for the „cutting 
back‟ of state intervention and control for a greater liberalization of participatory politics, 
with civil society as the „natural‟ crucible for democratic ends. The concept of civil 
society in this tradition precludes the social institutions of an independent judiciary, a free 
press, competition between political parties, as well as the general freedoms of speech, 
association, assembly and representation. For instance, John Keane defines civil society 
as “an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of 
non-state activities – economic and cultural production, household life and voluntary 
association – and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all 
sorts of pressure or controls upon state institutions.” 11 In a similar vein, Jean Cohen and 
Andrew Arato refer to it as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, 
composed above all the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of association 
(especially voluntary associations), social movements and the public sphere.
12
 
As such, scholarship of this tradition is troubled by the many cases of Asian civil 
society that exist in mutually complementary capacities alongside the state.
13
 Even 
among analysts who are skeptical of the promise underlying these ostensibly progressive 
prescriptions, many continue to frame the issue in terms of a fundamental opposition 
                                                 
11
 Keane, 1988: 14. 
12
 Cohen & Arato, 1992: 440-2. 
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between a hegemonic state and a constrained but democratic civil society.
14
 This has been 
thecentral approach to the work of Lenore Lyons, who have been long regarded as the 
expert on transnational migration and on the case studies of Tenaganita and TWC2. 
Lenore Lyons‟s recent works contributes to the emerging debate on the evolution 
and maturation of migrant advocacy movements in the Malaysia and Singapore.
15
 In 
arguing that the circumscribed attempts at „scaling up‟ by migrant advocacy groups of 
Singapore do not necessarily involve cross-border organizing, Lyons presents important 
modifications to earlier studies that assume cross-border activism and „transnational 
framing‟ as natural products of migrant worker movements. She uses the examples of 
TWC2 and HOME (Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics) to argue that 
while these two groups may belong to regional or international networks for the purposes 
of networking and mobilizing international solidarity for their domestic projects, both 
organizations often position themselves as partners to national development and thus 
articulate their responses in national, and not transnational terms. On the topic of „trans-
national framing‟, Lyons cautions readers against the strategy of subsuming migrant 
advocacy work under the rhetoric of „national interests‟. Because the symbolic 
entrepreneurship performed by TWC2 and HOME in campaigning against the 
exploitation of female migrant workers do not problematize but reify the gendered 
notions of vulnerability that inscribe the identity of these women, Lyons considers them 
to be supportive of the interests of the state and employers. Instead, Lyons points to 
                                                                                                                                                 
13
 For examples in Thailand, refer to the discussion in Banpasirichote, 2004. 
14





Tenaganita‟s firmer rights-based advocacy initiatives as a preferred alternative, citing it 
as representative of a stronger civil society that counters state ideology.  
For example, recent discourses within „trans-national‟ groups are oriented towards 
the aim of „empowerment‟ of subjugated groups. The re-orientation of social behaviours 
within empowerment discourses form part of a discourse supporting „participatory‟ 
approaches that emphasise „listening to the people,‟ „strengthening local organisational 
capacity‟ and developing „alternative strategies from below‟. But notions of what is 
„participatory‟ and „progressive‟ invariably denotes a value judgement on what is „good‟ 
for the consitituences served by the NGOs, and how „best‟ to do so. Such formulations 
still do not escape the managerialist and interventionist undertones inherent in 
subjectifying technologies inherent in „biowelfare‟. Of course, many field practitioners 
who face the everyday problems of project implementation, including those in 
Tenaganita, TWC2 and HOME, show an acute awareness of this paradox of participatory 
strategies. But in the optimistic insistence that “rights talk at least challenges existing 
gendered power relations,” it is easy to overlook how Lyons‟ preferred „trans-national‟ 
movements, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), similarly re-inscribe 
vulnerable subjectivities through the eligibility rules of their programmes. 
16
 Whether the 
advantages outweigh the risks remain unclear, especially if overt challenges by NGOs to 
existing power relations may come at a social and economic cost to the FDWs. 
Altogether, her position shares the assumption with many authors that civil 
society should be predisposed to act in ways that challenge the state‟s encroachment into 
                                                 
16
 See ILO, 2009. 
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other spheres of public life.
17
 However, we must be clear in our usage of the concept and 
not to conflate it with normative prescriptions on political spaces. I am less optimistic 
about the direct relationship between political liberalization and an expansionary civil 
society, as actually existing conditions in Asia do not fit with the assumption of the state 
and civil society as mutually exclusive spaces.
18
  
Turning to scholars who have long argued that citizenship possess negotiated, 
mutable contours have been most useful to helping me understanding the parameters 
where migrants rights claims might emerge in the restrictive environments of Malaysia 
and Singapore. Rather than an ideal type situation, as a relationship individually obtained 
and passively granted by a given state to an individual, Aihwa Ong and Pheng Cheah 
have separately looked at the plight of foreign domestic workers in Asia and argued that 
the rights claims through procedural or institutional mechanisms, such as rights 
associated with citizenship or through advocacy efforts by NGOs, are only part of the 
story for these women.
19
 Subject to change, citizenship and rights are acted upon 
collectively, or among individuals existing within social, political, and economic 
relations of collective conflict, which are in turn shaped by gendered, racial, class and 
internationally based state hierarchies. Framed this way, the prescription of political 
participation in civil society is misplaced because it benchmarks existing forms of 
citizenship against ideal types.
20
 
                                                 
17
 See, for example, Habermas, 1989 and Hayek, 1944. 
18
 See Rodan, 1997 for a discussion. This link between an expansionary civil society and democratisation is 
famously captured in Gellner, 1994. Other examples include Diamond, 1999; Misztal, 2000; Putnam et. 
al., 1993. 
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In developed Asian societies such as Malaysia and Singapore, the largest 
proportion of migrant workers work on short-term contracts without the realistic hope 
that they will ever be equal members of the political community. As one might expect, 
this gives rise to many injustices. It does not follow, however, that prescriptions of 
citizenship or an expansionary civil society will help to secure the interests of migrant 
workers. Daniel Bell has taken the argument further by suggesting that the special 
circumstances of some Asian societies may justify arrangements for differential rights. In 
these differentiated matrices of entitlements, migrants may receive citizenship-like 
protection based on a confluence of factors such as ethno-race, marketable skills, to name 
a few. Under the broad terms of „flexible citizenship‟ and „biowelfare‟, Ong and Pheng 
have also separately demonstrated how the mutable contours of citizenship can be shaped 
by NGOs like TWC2 and HOME to strategically include migrants within national 
discourses on gender and domestic work. Such an approach is a double edged sword; it is 
problematic because it involves the subjectification of migrant women as vulnerable 
mothers and daughters under biowelfare, but it can be useful in post-authoritarian 
contexts with costs attached to rights talk.  
Rather than an „unwillingness‟ to engage in a critique of exisitng NGO practices 
and state ideologies and thus deploy the „progressive‟ avenue of rights talk, my study is 
concerned with the empirical understanding of the specific reasons and costs as to why 
rights enacted through civil society is not always an option for FDWs. In doing so, I 
move away from a dichotomy between rights talk and biowelfare, and examine both as 
fluid discourses in themselves, without affixing either to a „progressive‟ and 
„conservative‟ label. This is not to fail to recognise the gendered, racialized and often 
  
13 
much restricted space for individual initative, but rather to examine, within the 
constraints encountered, how actors identify and create space for their own interests and 
for change. That is the crux of my study of the NGOs of this thesis, in understanding how 
strategic action takes shape within discursive limits, and not to offer a prescription on 
advocating „progressive‟ outcomes that overlook the empirical realities. 
 
Outline of the Thesis and the Ethnographic Fieldwork Process 
My decision to select groups that campaign on behalf of foreign women is informed by a 
framework of cultural studies and political theory that seeks to explore how identities 
traditionally denied from the national imagination may lay claim to rights. In doing so, it 
is to examine how these claims are organized and articulated publicly, and how certain 
discursive traditions regarding citizenship either attenuate or enhance their emergence. 
As a fragment of the postcolonial nation, the „woman question‟ asks us to consider how 
male-centric narratives of nationhood condition her inclusion and exclusion from 
complete citizenship.
21
 Feminist scholarship reminds us that beyond the bureaucracy and 
intelligentsia, women are critical for the biological, cultural and economical 
(re)production of the nation, and yet who are disqualified from the public political sphere. 
Her simultaneous recognition and repudiation by the nationalist project is revealing for 
feminist politics because it points to the spaces where claims through gender may be 
effected in some but not in others.  
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Where developmentalist states like Malaysia and Singapore increasingly link the 
modernization of their economies with the reproduction of the conventional nuclear 
family unit, the rights accrued to women ties her entitlements to her caregiver role in the 
family. For instance in Chapter 2, I discuss how the governments in Malaysia and 
Singapore have historically instituted incentives for female citizens to participate in the 
formal national economy without disrupting their expected roles as mothers. At the same 
time, feminist movements have, on occasion, taken the cue from these gendered 
subjectivities in lobbying for the reproductive rights and conjugal entitlements of women.  
In looking at some of the nationalist narratives of development, one can appreciate how 
the gendered inscriptions on women‟s citizenship can be simultaneously enabling and 
disempowering for women‟s groups. But for groups like TWC2 and Tenaganita, their 
activism on behalf of FDWs squares with nationality, in that the constituency they 
campaign for are comprised not only of women, but foreign women who have difficulty 
staking claims on their host societies. As citizens who help non-citizens, the „foreign‟ 
category of migrant workers complicates the activist‟s own subjective understanding of 
his/her own citizenship rights. Where white-collar non-citizens now accumulate partial 
and “flexible” rights during cross-border processes, citizens have also become sensitized 
to the idea that national membership no longer secures their protection.
22
 Instead, it is 
marketable skills that increasingly guarantee entitlements in this knowledge economy. 
FDWs, in addition to being „female‟ and „foreign‟ also lack the requisite skills for social 
mobility, and unsurprisingly encounter exploitative working conditions that entrench 
them in a vulnerable position. Thus the graduated approach to governing populations 
regardless of national membership, fostering some while denying others, is indicative of 
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larger shifts in national sovereignty that structure personal autonomy and social 
collectives. Far from closing off the spaces available for humanitarian claims, I argue in 
the later halves of Chapters 3 and 4, that these emerging trends in citizenship regimes and 
mutating state sovereignty do offer spaces for novel forms of political agency. Like her 
female citizen employer whose status as „working mother‟ legally guarantees her certain 
entitlements, the FDW‟s gendered and alien positionalities by no means signal her 
complete exclusion from the body politic of the host nation. 
   
CHAPTER TWO 
 
National Development and Labour Feminisation in 






Asia‟s participation in global economic configurations has sped up transnational 
migration, and the number of domestic workers circulating in the region has risen 
exponentially in the past decade.
1
 Due to the confluence of the changing conditions of the 
international division of labour and the policy responses of sending and receiving 
countries, these migrational inflows are highly-gendered in nature, both in terms of the 
increased levels of female migration and in the stratification of the migrant labour market 
along the lines of gender, ethnicity and nationality. For the labour-sending states, 
remittances by FDWs provide foreign exchange earnings while the outflow of manpower 
alleviates the burden on state welfare programs and the unemployment rate. It is also 
expected that return migrants will eventually contribute to the sending country‟s 
modernization with skills acquired from overseas employment. Whereas for host 
countries, the inflow of foreign manpower allows states to materially pursue its 
developmental goals without substantial costs, maintaining its legitimacy with a 
burgeoning middle-class electorate that views the rights of foreigners as subordinate to 
their quest for the „good life‟. 2 
This chapter examines the human costs to national development by tracing the 
historical conditions that foster the mistreatment of FDWs. I begin by examining the 
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developmental discourses of Malaysia and Singapore to reveal how ideas on gender and 
citizenship have marked the institution of domestic labour. In the early phases of national 
growth, the engineered feminization of the labour force brought about changes in 
women‟s roles in both countries. While required to participate in the burgeoning 
manufacturing sector, women are culturally expected to perform the role of the sole 
reproductive agent within the family, thereby revealing the highly gendered inflexions in 
the nationalist discourses on development. Without unsettling these cultural norms 
regarding housework and child rearing, the state facilitates the influx of foreigners as 
substitute labour in the domestic sphere. Using the framework of biopolitics, the chapter 
argues that FDWs are suspended within a liminal state through processes of household 
incarceration and surveillance, as well as securitization discourses on the national-level. 
 
The ‘Wife of the Wife’ 
As a fixture of many middle-class families in the region, FDWs originate from the 
neighbouring countries of Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Singapore is a major 
receiving country with 170,000 domestic workers now employed in every one of six 
households.
3
 Malaysia‟s occupational restructuring has also induced a demand for low 
wage, unskilled workers as Malaysians move up the labour value chain. In 2008, 
governmental figures pegged the number of documented migrant workers in Malaysia at 
2.1 million, amongst whom a sizeable group of 315,703 women are deployed as domestic 
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 According to 2004 governmental statistics, 44.9 percent of female non-
Malaysians were employed in the category “private households with employed persons” 
compared to just 2.6 percent of Malaysian female citizens.  
With the rising demand, maid agencies have sprung up, notably with more than 
two thousand agencies in Singapore offering local employers a wide selection of female 
migrant labour for their household needs. Today, maid agency endorsements by 
celebrities are hardly novel within a national consciousness that has tied class aspirations 
with bonded labour. In Singapore, a newspaper advertisement by privately owned Nation 
Employment Agency features Xiang-Yun, a forty-five year old actress typecasted for her 
motherly demeanour, next to a smiling FDW, signifying an idealized version of 
employer-employee relations. Readers are brought to the attention of the agency‟s quality 
service, which is measured by the preparation of FDWs through rigorous training 
standards, including infant care, cooking, and spoken English. The agency also 
emphasizes its ethical and efficient operation through accreditation schemes, 
simultaneously guaranteeing a low price point for employers.   
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Fig. 2.1: Maid agency advertisements in Singapore‟s mainstream press. 
The above description is pertinent for the forthcoming discussion on Malaysia and  
Singapore because it encodes the productive FDW as a specific vision of the „good life‟ 
for the career woman. Historically, the developmentalist expectations on the female 
citizens in both countries – as productive women contributing to national growth and as 
reproductive housewives – encourages the circulation of foreign women to fill in 
domestic labour gaps brought about by local women‟s entry into the workforce.5 Within 
the nationalist project of human betterment through hyper-industrialisation, two 
interdependent but asymmetrical subject-positions emerge; the highly-educated „working 
mother‟ and the alien domestic worker.6 While the FDWs‟ contribution to the household 
allows local women to participate in the workforce without undermining assumptions of 
housework as feminine labour, the introduction of FDWs destabilizes local women‟s 
position as the household‟s de-facto caregiver.7 Instances of abuse occur when the 
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unequal power relationship between the two is unmoderated, culminating in what 
anthropologist Aihwa Ong has described as the eruption of “neoslavery” in Asia.8  
In her landmark study of Malaysia‟s domestic service, Christine Chin argues that 
the Malaysian public has been able to ignore the plight of Filipino and Indonesian 
domestic workers because of the emerging convergence of interests between the middle-
classes and the state elite.
9
 While the ability to consume the services of domestic helpers 
allows the Malaysian middle-classes to attain their material aspirations of the „good life‟, 
Chin views the state‟s concurrent role in shaping contemporary domestic service as 
encouraging the middle-class adoption of the nuclear family form.
10
 At the national level, 
members of Malaysia‟s dual-income nuclear family form become the exemplar subjects 
of an „Asian modernity‟, and are expected to contribute to the economic advantage of the 
country‟s modernization project of „Wawasan 2020‟ (Vision 2020). In turn, the 
feminization of the workforce has precipitated a desirable „modern‟ identity for the 
educated woman who excels at the reproductive duties of a homemaker, while 
simultaneously contributing to national development as a professional working woman.
11
 
 Chin‟s insight; that the tethering of modernization projects with the reorganization 
of reproductive labour actually preconditions maid abuse is important on two accounts. 
Firstly, it shifts attention away from cases of personal pathology among employers as 
commonly portrayed by mainstream media, bringing instead the structural conditions of 
poor employment conditions to stark relief. Secondly, in tying the issue of abuse with the 
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gendered element of reproductive labour, Chin‟s analysis also probes the ways in which 
discourses on national growth requires the differentiated regulation of two female bodies; 
the middle-class female citizen and the FDW. Interestingly, while Chin‟s discussion is 
still couched within Gramscian terms, she does refer to the „infrapolitics‟ of domestic 
service, highlighting the techniques of surveillance practised by employers on the FDWs. 
The disciplinarian element has since been greatly elaborated by the themes of biopower 
and biopolitics in the separate but similar works of Pheng Cheah and Aihwa Ong.
12
 
I take up some of these perspectives in examining the question of maid abuse as 
exposing ruptures in the matrix of four separate but related fields: (a) between the middle 
class „working mother‟ and the state over her rights to secure affordable replacement 
reproductive labour while she enters the workforce under the auspices of national 
development, (b) between the FDW and the state over the under-protection of her body as 
expatriate labour, (c) between the employer and the FDW, where in the absence of clear 
legislation governing their relationship, the care and discipline of the FDW is 
situationally managed by the household, and (d) between the developmentalist state and 
the two subject-populations, where a hierarchical system of citizenship ranks the 
„working mothers‟ above FDWs according to their perceived worth in the economy. 
Here I refer to Ong, who deploys the concept of “graduated sovereignty” in 
highlighting the flexible modes of governance in developmentalist states.
13
 Graduated 
sovereignty allows the state to address FDW claims against abuse without undermining 
its legitimacy with an increasingly nationalistic electorate. A combination of direct 
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intervention in legislating aspects of the domestic worker hiring processes is erected to 
protect her welfare, and yet a dissociation is achieved by delegating the organizing of her 
everyday life to the employer.
14
 This novel form of population management, which fits 
within a „calculus‟ of citizenship that subdivides populations according to economic 
value, debunks earlier arguments that the onset of globalization and migration would 
necessitate the erosion of state sovereignty.
15
 Rather, the mutation of citizenship beyond a 
dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion affirms the shift towards a system of governance 
that disregards territorial boundaries.
16
 More importantly, the frame of biopolitics 
captures the disciplinary nature of domestic service and its elements of securitization that 
were previously implied but not developed in Chin‟s work. 
The next two sections will sketch out an overview of the body-politics of 
reproductive labour in Singapore and Malaysia, where I explain how the reworking of 
gender ideologies by developmentalist narratives fosters (a) a female citizen-subjectivity 
that oscillates between the public and private roles of career woman and housewife, and 
(b) the creation of the subjugated category of FDWs through a disciplinary household 
regime and techniques of national securitization. I return in the final section to discuss the 
implications of these gendered developmental discourses and how they enact the 
conditions for maid abuse. 
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Nationalism and ‘Working Mothers’ in Singapore 
As a nation scarce in natural resources, Singapore‟s developmental vision was driven by 
export-oriented manufacturing since the 1970s and supported by an educational emphasis 
on its citizens as skilled labourers. This developmentalist model of statecraft implies 
disciplinary techniques that seek to improve the labour force through innumerable 
schemes of training and subjectification, including the quelling of labour unions and an 
overhaul of the education system to suit market demands for a cheap and competent 
labour force.
17
 The gradual inclusion of women into the formal economy channelled 
women‟s reproductive labour beyond the confines of the domestic sphere; the female 
labour force participation rates (LFPR) in services and manufacturing rose from 19.3% in 
1957 to 24.6% in 1970.
18
 As Singapore moved beyond manufacturing to consolidate its 
position in Asia as a financial and communications hub in the 1980s, women continued to 
join the ranks of professional workers, and the female LFPR soared to 47% in 1987 and 
subsequently 51% in 1997.
19
 While the industrialisation process was seemingly a high 
point for gender equality, the mobilisation of women into the economy does not entail a 
clear commitment to the principle of a gender-equal citizenship, but are motivated by the 
urgent needs of development.
20
 
Indeed, state paternalism became evident when the impact of industrialisation on 
falling marriage and reproductive rates were threatening to unravel Singapore‟s economic 
growth. In the early 1980s, the „National Father‟ and erstwhile Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
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Yew enunciated a reproductive crisis that threatened to halt the country‟s development.21 
Framed as the „Great Marriage Debate‟, Lee‟s concern was that graduate women were 
not producing sufficient babies to reach a desired replacement ratio, either because of a 
reluctance to marry, or a failure to bear more than a desired number of children per 
couple after marriage. On the other hand, Lee was concerned that the „genetic quality‟ of 
the nation would be compromised as lower-educated women were reproducing too freely. 
Speaking at the National Day Rally of 1983, Lee articulated that, 
If we continue to reproduce ourselves in this lopsided way, we will be 
unable to maintain our present standards. Levels of competency will 
decline.  Our economy will falter, the administration will suffer, and the 
society will decline. For how can we avoid lowering performance when 
for every two graduates, in twenty-five years time, there will be one 
graduate, and for every two uneducated workers, there will be three? 





Operating on the trope of society as body-machine, Lee‟s dystopic vision of a Singapore 
ravaged by an „errant‟ female sexuality reveals a desire to control women‟s sexuality and 
to engineer marriage between „genetically superior‟ graduates. In response to the 
demographic crisis, the government instituted the Graduate Mother‟s Scheme in 1983, 
aimed at regulating the „overly productive‟ sexuality of working-class females by 
disbursing awards of $10,000 to restrict their childbearing to two children, after which 
recipients were to register for sterilisation.
23
 On the other hand, the state sought to entice 
the graduate mother with tax incentives, medical insurance privileges and priority school 
entrance for her children. 
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While the eugenic dimensions of the Graduate Mother‟s Scheme have drawn 
objections as class-inflected,
24
 little has been said about the relationship between the state 
and the „working mother‟ formed within these developmental discourses. For one, the 
expectation that women publicly (re)produce nationalism with their work and wombs 
engenders a twin demand on women as professionals and mothers.
25
 While the conflict 
between both subject-positions were historically resolved by employing lived-in domestic 
servants (mui tsai or amahs) that helped with domestic work or through the extended 
family,
26
 the decline of traditional arrangements for reproductive work created a shortage 
of domestic help available for working women.
27
 This was exacerbated by the growth of 
the manufacturing and services industry immediately after Singapore‟s independence, 
which siphoned off young female entrants previously employed in domestic services.
28
 In 
recognizing that its expectation of female citizen LFPRs depended on a cheap and steady 
supply of replacement domestic labour, the government acknowledged its obligations to 
professional women by introducing a work permit system in 1978 to allow for the limited 
recruitment of domestic helpers from neighbouring countries.
29
 
Within this transnational relay of reproductive labour, the state asserts that there is 
no contradiction between its developmentalist demand on women to (re)produce both 
publicly and privately, and refers to a series of policies that inscribe a dual role of female 
citizen-subjects as „working mothers‟. These incentives form part of the state‟s post-
independence delivery of entitlements to women, and include legislated maternity leave, 
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monthly subsidies for the use of child care centres and tax rebates for hiring a FDW.
30
 
However, the solution of importing foreign maids did not address the demands of all 
local women. In stating that its intention was not to “encourage women with low skills to 
hire maids to look after their families so that they can take up low-paying jobs” since that 
would “merely be replacing one group of unskilled workers with another”, a maid levy 
imposed on employers ensured that only professional women can afford FDWs, since the 
“government‟s objective is primarily to encourage women with higher skills to remain in 
the workforce and to have children.”31 The state‟s developmental calculus thus consigns 
domestic labour to the „unskilled‟ category and that it should be performed only by 




Modernisation, Reproduction and Malaysia’s Family Values 
The majority of FDWs began arriving during the period of heavy industrialization, 
largely an outcome of Malaysia‟s New Economic Policy (NEP) 1971-1990.33 As an 
official intervention into Malay middle-class constitution and the modern consumption of 
FDWs, the NEP offers a historical backdrop to the modernization project of Wawasan 
2020. Where it differs from Singapore is in its overt articulation of the racial element in 
speaking about national development. Since independence in 1957, Malaysian politics 
has been premised on the management of „bangsa‟ (races). Following colonial „divide-
                                                 
30
 Pyle, 1997. 
31
 Huang & Yeoh, 1996: 485. See also The Straits Times, 6 March 1992, 11 March 1992. Meant primarily 
as a mechanism to dampen the demand for foreign workers and to enforce their transience, the levy has 
risen with the number of foreign maids: first set in 1982, it remained at its initial level of S$120 per 
month until January 1989 but has since steadily and rapidly risen to its 2008 rate of S$265 per month due 
to rising demand. 
32
 Lazar, 2001: 71. 
  
27 
and-rule‟ policies which concentrated formal political power in the Malay majority while 
distributing the economy between European and Chinese control, the inter-ethnic socio-
economic gaps were compounded by the influx of peasant Malays without a 
corresponding effort in their economic reintegration.
34
  
Table 2.2 NEP Restructuring Targets and Achievements 
 Target (%) Achieved (%) 
 1970 1990 1990 
EMPLOYMENT RESTRUCTURING 
Bumiputera/Malay 
Primary Sector 67.6 61.4 71.2 
Secondary Sector 30.8 51.9 48.0 
Tertiary Sector 37.9 48.4 51.0 
Non-Bumiputera/Non-Malay 
Primary Sector 32.4 38.6 28.8 
Secondary Sector 69.2 48.1 52.0 
Tertiary Sector 62.1 51.6 49.0 
OWNERSHIP RESTRUCTURING 
Bumiputera 2.4 30.0 20.3 
Other Malaysians 32.3 40.0 46.2 
Foreigners 63.3 30.0 25.1 
Nominee 
Companies 
2.0 - 8.4 
Source: Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister‟s Office, 
Malaysia, ([n.d.]). 
 
It was during the 1960s that the ethno-racialized and gendered term of „Bumiputera‟ 
(literally „princes of the soil‟ but more commonly circulated as „sons of the soil‟) entered 
public consciousness with the discontentment against the state‟s failure to protect Malay 
privilege. Ethnic violence between the Malays and the Chinese after the May 1969 
general elections eventually forced the leading United Malays National Organization 
(UMNO) to introduce the NEP to “eradicate poverty” and to restructure society by 
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detaching ethnic identity from economic role. However, the net effect of the NEP was the 
simultaneous de-emphasizing of ethno-racial cleavages in certain domains while 
renewing them in others. For instance, not only would the NEP perpetuate Malay 
political dominance, it also instituted a racial balance sheet for the economy by projecting 
a redistribution of corporate wealth from non-Malays to Bumiputera from 2.4 percent in 
1971 to 30 percent in 1990.  
Concurrently, the state ideology of „Rukunegara‟, spelt out in a series of Five-
Year Plans, envisions a Malaysia in which the Bumiputera were to become capitalists, 
professionals and knowledge workers; modern „sons of the soil‟ who were to know 
themselves through their rights to national wealth. More recently, the state-propagated 
ideological emphasis on Melayu Baru (New Malay) and Islam Hadhari (entrepreneurial 
Islam) continues along this thread of attaching value to upwardly-mobile Malay men as 
the ideal citizen-subjects of Malaysia‟s modernization.35 In forging a new class of 
modern Malays through industrial restructuring, ideas on women and the family were 
also remodeled. Despite ideological exclusion of women from these discourses, one 
outcome of the NEP was the general economic demand for female workers. Official 
census data between 1970 and 1980 saw 73,000 women joining the secondary industries 
of Malaysia‟s economy. In setting up free-trade zones (FTZs) and wooing foreign capital 
to set up factories, Malaysia‟s female LFPR for the manufacturing sector rose from 29% 
in 1970 to 40% in 1980.
 36
  
The rising economic independence of women should not be mistaken for a 
concurrent improvement in gender equality. Rather, the high rate of female participation 
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in the labour-intensive manufacturing sector owes itself to the stratification of labour that 
continues to ascribe certain economic functions for women. In a revealing brochure 
produced by the Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA), the „natural‟ talents 
of Malaysian women were peddled to multinational corporations to encourage them to set 
up „pioneer-status‟ industries in the FTZs:  “The manual dexterity of the Oriental Female 
is famous the world over. Her hands are small and she works with extreme care. Who, 
therefore, could be better qualified by nature and inheritance to contribute to the 
efficiency of a production line than the Oriental girl?”37 Through the feminization of the 
workforce, the industrialization strategy that was originally premised on creating a male 
Malay working class had gradually produced a female industrial force because of the 
demand for cheaper workers. However, as women‟s participation in occupational 
restructuring was never recognized by the state (Malaysia has no „equal pay for equal 
work‟ clause in its labour laws), the fruits of the NEP accrued to women are only 
„accidental‟ in nature.38  
The persistence of these gendered inflections is captured in the responses against 
women‟s newfound independence in the seventies, often circulating under the metaphors 
of „minah karan‟ and „bohsia girls‟.39 Within the kampung (village), Aihwa Ong notes 
the evisceration of gender norms as more and more Muslim men came to associate the 
economic ascendancy of women with an emasculation of paternity rights.
40
 She notes that 
for the first time in Malay history, industrialization had induced a large number of young 
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Muslim women with “the money and social freedom to experiment with a new sense of 
self”.41 As thousands of Malay peasant girls migrated into cities, they contributed their 
income to consumer durables and home renovations that were presentations of the new 
wealth of kampung (village) families.
42
 Unsurprisingly, the dakwah (Islamicist) 
movement came to conflate women‟s economic independence with the dystopia of family 
crisis and moral decay.
43
 In this state of moral confusion over gender roles and conjugal 
relations, women‟s newfound freedom was perceived to have been achieved at the cost of 
the country‟s socio-economic future. 
In seeking to resolve the tension between economic restructuring and the moral 
social order, Malaysia chose to redomesticate women through idealized images of wife 
and mother to diffuse male fears of female domination in the labour market. It also 
implemented policies for a larger population and workforce that could sustain the labour 
and market demands of modernization. In 1984, erstwhile Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohammed inaugurated the National Population Policy (NPP), which involved a shift 
towards pro-natalist policies to achieve the state‟s target of a population of 70 million in 
115 years: “Recognizing that a larger population constitutes an important human resource 
to create a larger consumer base with an increasing purchasing power to generate and 
support industrial growth through productive exploitation of natural resources, Malaysia 
could, therefore, plan for a larger population which could ultimately reach 70 million.”44  
Put differently, the pro-natalist NPP was a concerted effort to derive a sizeable 
workforce and domestic market to fuel the productive and consumptive power required 
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for a modern economy. By viewing the population as an organic system of living beings 
with biological traits and by linking these features with perceived economic value, 
society-as-body could therefore be regulated through processes that aim to augment 
Malaysia‟s economic resources. As constitutive of a „biopolitics of the population‟, the 
NPP was thus implemented by reinforcing women‟s roles as homemakers, in extending 
maternity incentives to mothers for their first five children, and an increase of tax relief 
for the third to fifth child to boost birth rates. 
 From the 1980s to the early 1990s, Malaysia‟s economy depended on the 
(re)productive energies of women as rapid economic growth had bolstered labour 
demand. For most of the middle-class families in this study, current levels of 
consumption continue to depend on women‟s participation in formal sectors of work. 
Unsurprisingly, one of the biggest problems faced by many female respondents is the 
constant need to juggle the demands of a career, childcare problems and housework. As 
with the case in Singapore, the occupational restructuring of professions have channelled 
a sizeable proportion of women previously employed as lived-in domestics to the 
workforce in search of better pay and working hours.
45
  
In turn, the class-reproduction efforts of middle-class families increasingly rely on 
working-class domestic helpers. After a 1986 ban by the Labour Ministry on the inflow 
of migrant labour in response to moral outrage over the rising numbers of “illegals”, state 
authorities finally acknowledged the long term demands for low-wage foreign labour. In 
1986-87, the ban was lifted as the Immigration Department of Malaysia reopened the 
gates, with the hiring of FDWs under revised recruitment guidelines. However, only 
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specific groups were allowed entry on the terms of ethno-race, gender and nationality. 
For instance, the immigration of male domestic servants into Malaysia is still strictly 
prohibited on the grounds that “it would create social problems”.46 Importing women 
from China was also disallowed on the pretext that these „little dragon ladies‟ are often 
the reasons for family wreckage, apart from the potential „imbalance‟ it might precipitate 
in Malaysia‟s ethnic ratio.47 Consequently, the laws limit the definition of FDWs (or 
Pembantu Rumah Asing, „PRA‟ in governmental terms) specifically to healthy women 
between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five, who are nationals of the Philippines, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Cambodia. 
Given that Wawasan 2020 depends on the fostering of specific classes of citizens, 
these guidelines reinforce the impression that domestic helpers were not a uniform 
privilege available to Malaysian families of all classes. Primarily, the Immigration 
Department instituted directives for agencies and requires employers to submit marriage 
certificates, income tax records and children‟s birth certificates (or medical reports of 
invalid elderly) as part of the application process.
48
 These documents require prospective 
employers to be married, with children below the age of fifteen or who have sick elderly 
requiring extensive care before they are awarded with the privilege of hiring a FDW. 
Both husband and wife of the applying household must also furnish evidence of a 
combined income of at least RM$5,000.00 to qualify for Filipino or Sri Lankan FDWs, or 
RM$3,000.00 for helpers from Thailand, Indonesia and Cambodia. Not only would these 
documentary requirements normalize domestic work as gendered labour performed by 
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unskilled women, they also promote the dual-income nuclear family as a basis for 
inclusion into Malaysia‟s expanding middle-class.  
 
Confinement and Securitization in Foreign Domestic Work 
The FDW‟s disadvantaged position is conditioned by an interrelationship between 
globalization, nationalism, and moral systems that view the assimilation of foreign 
women into households with suspicion. This section examines the outcome of policies in 
Malaysia and Singapore,which contribute towards the position of FDWs as a largely 
„invisible‟ category under labour laws, and how processes of localized household 
surveillance and national immigration and security policies coincide to regulate their 
presence as a „bio-commodities‟. 49 
Primarily, the Employment Act in both Malaysia and Singapore narrowly defines 
FDWs as “domestic servants”, who enjoy limited rights and protection.50 The legislation 
excludes her from provisions relating to the number of rest days, holidays annual leave 
and sick leave, limitations on hours of work and conditions for the termination of 
contract. With the exception of Filipino FDWs who are protected by standardized 
contracts enforced by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), 
FDWs of other nationalities do not sign standardized contracts with their employers to 
ensure minimum wages and rest days. The exclusion of FDWs from the Workmen‟s 
Compensation Act in both countries also highlights the absence of legal coverage for 
work-related accidents.  
  
34 
Responding to the public outrage over the surge of abuse cases in 1987, the 
Human Resource Minister of Malaysia presented the official reason for the exclusion of 
FDWs from legal coverage as a „definitional‟ issue: “We will have problems defining for 
instance, their [domestic workers] hours of work and the value of their accommodation 
by employers if they were to be included in the Employment Act.”51 The NGO proposals 
in 2003 to overhaul guidelines on domestic service, was rebuked by the Human Resource 
Minister: “there is no need to include maids in the Employment Act as a household is 
generally not considered a workplace.”52 In Singapore, labour minister S. Rajaratnam 
explained in a parliamentary hearing in 1968 that “the nature of the duties of this 
category of employees is not amenable to regulation by ordinary labour legislation. For 
instance, the normal working day of 8 hours for the average employee cannot possibly be 
applied to the working conditions of [domestic workers]. The nature of duties requires 
them, as a rule, to be „attached‟ to their place of work. Under the circumstances, it is best 
that conditions of employment for this category of workers be left to be determined by 
mutual agreement”.53 In constructing the domestic worker as a “member of the family”, it 
follows that the enforcement of labour law on work hours and rest days are difficult to 
regulate and should be left to market forces and private arrangements made between the 
household and the FDW.
54
 
In not recognizing domestic work as productive labour, the difficulty in 
monitoring the foreign labour trade has further undermined the protection of FDWs. One 
Malaysian official has since remarked that: “Laws for domestic workers and migrants are 
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not clearly defined…. Maids are not really protected…. This issue is difficult to monitor. 
They are one by one [in individual households], how can we monitor? It is up to them to 
report. To get an organization to monitor maids is unlikely. Who is going to do that?”55 
For instance, despite labour recruitment agents being commonly identified as one element 
in the equation of FDW exploitation, foreign labour recruitment licenses are easily 
obtainable and monitoring mechanisms to regulate employment agencies in Malaysia 
remain lacking.
56
 The “Guidelines for taking in a Domestic Worker (PRA)” stipulate the 
responsibilities of employers entering into a „contract of service‟ with FDWs, requiring 
Malaysian employers to provide “appropriate and accessible living conditions”, 
“nutritious food” and “at least eight hours of rest”.57  In reality, these regulations are 
difficult to enforce as the „appropriateness‟ and the „quality‟ of food varies according to 
the employer‟s own perceptions on what the FDW‟s quality of life should be. 
In the case of Singapore‟s Employment Agencies Act, which governs the 
operation and establishment of maid agencies in Singapore, the legal concern is with the 
integrity of agencies as businesses. To date, there is no clear stipulation on the authority 
of the Commissioner of Labour who executes this legislation in the suspension of agent 
licenses.
58
 Similarly, Singapore‟s Employment of Foreign Manpower Act, the singular 
piece of legislation that has direct bearing on the FDW‟s employment, only controls the 
technical parameters of the employment contract without providing any clear guidelines 
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on social behaviour towards the FDW.
59
 As the legislation concerns itself with work 
permit technicalities and impose a hefty levy and a security bond of SGD$5000 on 
employers,
60
 it may at times work against the domestic worker, especially if the employer 
chooses to defray the levy cost by overworking and underpaying her.
61
 In sum, abuse 
cases involving FDWs are often handled by authorities on an ad-hoc basis. This „hands-
off‟ approach and the lack of consensus in regulating domestic work affirm what 
observers claim to be a governmental attitude that “prefers to leave the free market to 
determine the wages and other conditions of service for foreign maids”.62  
The management of the FDW is perhaps best encapsulated within a dual 
mechanism of disciplinarian practices within the household and securitization at the level 
of the nation-state.
63
 At the household level, many commentators have pointed to the 
common practice of long working hours, a lack of rest days and the withholding of 
passports under the pretext of her „running away‟.64 Even benign employers do not as a 
matter of norm give regular day-offs to domestic workers, effectively restricting their 
movements within the household for continuous housework and surveillance.
65
 In part, 
this pervading sense of distrust of FDWs also arise from the risk of potential financial 
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loss should an FDW go „missing‟; a RM445 “maid levy” and a RM10 stamp duty is 
imposed by Malaysia for each new hire and does not include agent fees which can 
amount to RM5,000 for each domestic helper.
66
 In particular, Christine Chin‟s work on 
the “infrapolitics” of domestic service attests to the practice of confinement by employers 




My interviews with a four female employers highlights the mounting distrust of 
the FDW, whose sexual allure must be frequently monitored to prevent misconduct.
 68
 
These moral boundaries, which crosscut ethno-racial prejudices on the „dirtiness‟ of 
foreign women, are further reinforced by ocassional press reports of „runaway‟ FDWs 
arrested for sex work and stories of rape and seduction by male employers. 
69
 Of greater 
concern is the convergence of these individual or collective fears over the perceived 
sexual and criminal tendencies of the FDWs with governmental interests in controlling 
their public presence. For instance, Ong has argued that the two year term enforced by 
the work permit system in Singapore creates the impression that employers‟ investment 
on the training and acculturation of the FDW is potentially a drain on familial 
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 The sense of „betrayal‟ becomes even greater when domestic workers are 
found guilty of misconduct despite their employers‟ emotional and material investment, 
reaffirming suspicion of their „outsider‟ status. According to an NGO report on 
Singapore, sites of violence emerge when the asymmetrical power relations between the 
female employer and the FDW is not held in abeyance. Coupled with the suspicion on 
their sexuality, the discourses on domestic work have created a situation in Singapore 
where female employers are more likely to oppress FDWs than male employers.
71
 
Beyond the „infrapolitics‟ of domestic work, policies of securitization have the 
effect of maintain the transience of these women, preventing them from settling into the 
host countries as naturalized citizens. In Singapore, these include the work permit system 
under the Employment of Foreign Worker‟s Act, which limits the FDW‟s stay to two 
years, subject to renewals.
72
 FDWs are not allowed to bring along dependants, apply for 
citizenship or to get married with Singaporean men in the course of their employment. 
The FDW is regulated through health check-ups and deportation is enforced in the event 
of pregnancy to prevent claims to citizenship. As policies that maintain her transience and 
sterility, current employment practices exclude the FDW from reproductive activities of 
her own. In Malaysia, the regulation of FDWs is an issue of „national security‟ for 
enforcement agencies. Like Singapore, the list of exclusionary immigration regulations 
limits the FDWs‟ stay to two years under the temporary work permit, disallowing her 
marriage with Malaysian men, and restricts accompanying dependants.
73
  FDWs are 
subjected to three medical check-ups annually, and in cases of pregnancy or sexually-
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transmitted diseases, procedures of deportation are implemented without the provision of 
medical treatment. This combination of confinement and securitization, both in 
commodifying and confining the FDW‟s presence to the household, culminates in what 
Ong has described as a system of „neoslavery‟.74 
 
The contradictions between Malaysia‟s labour and immigration laws also obstruct 
the access to justice for many abused FDWs. By viewing migration as „fundamentally‟ a 
matter of policing borders and criminalizing „illegal‟ migrants, the practice of enforcing 
punitive immigration laws on undocumented foreign workers ignores the nature of these 
cases as matters of enforcing of labour laws and contractual obligations. Malaysia‟s 
Employment Act has no clear provisions where a FDW awaiting her case against 
employers may reside legally in the country without persecution under the Immigration 
Act. Police, immigration authorities and the local RELA militia (Ikatan Relawan Rakyat 
Malaysia, or “Volunteers of Malaysian People”) who arrest undocumented FDWs during 
nation-wide raids, often fail to screen them to ascertain if they are escaping trafficking or 
other forms of abuse and exploitation. Once apprehended, FDWs like other irregular 
migrants are processed into Malaysia‟s detention centres and do not have access to legal 
representation or a translator. 
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Fig. 2.3: Presentation by Ishak Mohamed, Director of Malaysia‟s Immigration Enforcement Branch.75 
 
 
Currently, FDWs who wish to complain against employers or pursue criminal 
cases must apply for a temporary one month special passes costing RM100 per month, 
because their temporary work permits and entry visas are tied to their employers. Once 
they leave their employers, even for reasons of abuse or the withholding of wages, the 
FDW loses her legal status and may be incarcerated, fined and deported under Malaysia‟s 
immigration laws.
 76
 For transfer from one employer to the next, the FDW must return 
home and await the issuance of a new visa for her re-entry. While the special passes from 
the Immigration Department grants her legal residence for one month to attend to legal 
proceedings but disallows her from engaging in temporary employment, court cases take 
much longer than what the permit allows.  
Faced with pressures from NGOs, international humanitarian organizations and 
the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines, Malaysia has implemented a series of 
policy measures that aim to address maid abuse. Recently, these include a mandatory 
                                                 
75
 Mohamed, 2008. 
  
41 
insurance scheme for FDWs, a hotline for employers and domestic workers, a half-day 
induction program for new employers, as well as increased commitment to prosecuting 
employers and agents for harbouring undocumented migrants, abuse and salary arrears 
issues.
77
 The Malaysian state has considered adopting standardized training programs for 
FDWs as implemented by the Malaysian Association of Foreign Maid Agencies, to 
achieve desired standards from the new FDWs.
78
 In recent years, Singapore‟s Ministry of 
Manpower (MOM) has also responded to pressures regarding the FDWs plight in several 
ways. These measures include a mandatory induction program for new employers and 
employees, increased commitment to prosecuting employers for unpaid wages and 
physical abuse, operating helplines, introducing an accreditation program for 
employment agencies, and enforcing stiffer penalties for errant agents.
79
  
However, these concessions to humanitarian pressures are limited as attention is 
deflected away from the state, whose national development projects depend on labour 
importation. One exposition of the problem of maid abuse by Pheng Cheah is to view it 
as “primarily one of concrete structural conditions that are inherently conducive to the 
widespread dehumanization of FDWs and only secondarily a matter of personal cruelty 
or pathology of individual employers”.80 Following this observation, state efforts at 
curtailing the conflict zones within the family can be seen as attempts at maintaining the 
structures of labour deployment and not benevolent protection. For neoslavery to 
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function, the FDW‟s body is maintained to upkeep the relay of reproductive labour into 
households. Even so, the FDW is not enhanced through training or legal validation on the 
grounds of her position as „unskilled‟ foreigner. Within this economy of domestic work, 
NGOs campaigning for the protection of FDWs become arbiters against abuse. Chapters 
3 and 4 examine how these efforts take similar as well as divergent paths in their 
expression and development, pointing once again to the political intricacies that 
differentiate Malaysia and Singapore‟s governmental regimes. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 





NGOs have been long regarded as important actors in addressing the inadequacies of 
migrant entitlements through the register of rights.
1
 In Singapore and Malaysia, domestic 
political conditions and their limited legal status constrains the ability of migrants to self-
organize, and thus migrants depend significantly on local citizens to highlight their 
concerns. Cross-country studies on Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Taiwan 
acknowledges the non-traditional, non-union labour organizations that fill the political 
void left by trade unions for migrant protection.
2
 The introduction of a social movement 
perspective on the question of migrant rights is therefore important as it is through such 
movements that engender the empowerment of workers through education, knowledge 
provision and eventually participation in „voice institutions‟.3  
This chapter reviews the efforts by two social movements in Singapore as they 
search for the best way to campaign for the interests of FDWs. The city-state‟s resistance 
to rights talk has been well documented and it provides a chance to discuss and take stock 
of the different strategies of enacting rights claims within an illiberal polity. Furthermore, 
as Singapore views FDWs as a transient, unskilled labour force occupying an almost 
invisible position within the legal-politico terrain, these women are caught in a liminal 
position without access to many liberties. Under these circumstances, how would NGOs 
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convince other citizens that the immigrants should have equal access to resources and 
protection on the terms of rights? 
Lenore Lyons has tracked the constraints for organizing on behalf of migrants in 
Singapore to the 1987 „Marxist Conspiracy‟, where the state detained twenty-two people 
under the Internal Security Act.
4 
Many were social workers and volunteers who were part 
of the Geylang Catholic Centre for Foreign Workers (GCC), which had advocated for 
better working conditions for all workers in Singapore, including migrants. However, the 
government viewed their efforts as a front to “radicalise student and Christian activists” 
and the GCC was subsequently closed.
5
 Critics of Singapore‟s „soft-authoritarian‟ 
government have since pointed to democratic deficits in public life for the general 
unwillingness to engage in political mobilisation on behalf of cultural communities, 
including foreign workers.
6
 Contrasting the state of migrant activism between Hong 
Kong and Singapore where more than twenty pro-migrant NGOs operate in the former 
and only a handful in the latter, Daniel Bell has suggested that the situation is indicative 
of the lack of civil liberties in Singapore (vis-à-vis Hong Kong) for agents to organize 
and protest for their interests.
7
 Similarly, a local study by Brenda Yeoh and Shirlena 
Huang has linked the poor situation of migrant protection to a „weak‟ civil society.8 
Instead of direct contention, political observers of Singapore commonly point to a 
difference between „civil society‟, an independent domain necessary for the advancement 
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of democratic interests and rights, and „civic society‟ as a constrained political space that 
local rights-based groups operate within.
9
  
Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2) was one such group that found its 
humanitarian objectives to be constrained by the state‟s discourse of civic society. It first 
emerged in 2002 as a response to the shocking abuse and death of 19-year old Indonesian 
Muawanatul Chasanah.
10
 After a highly publicized media campaign as “The Working 
Committee 2”, the group became formalized as “Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2)” 
through registration under Singapore‟s Societies Act in 2004, and it undertook an 
expansion of its previous objectives to protect female domestic workers to include all 
migrant workers. The aim of the new TWC2 was to “promote respect for domestic 
workers through education, and secure better treatment of domestic workers through 
legislation and other means”.11 This is evident in the group‟s decision to move away from 
using the denigratory „maids‟ to „foreign domestic workers‟, as well as its campaign 
strategy to improve „conditions of work‟, thereby situating its advocacy within the 
nationalist narrative of development via labour importation strategies. In a book on 
TWC2‟s formation titled “Dignity Overdue”, founding members John Gee and Elaine Ho 
reveal that: 
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Many employers have valid reasons to complain about their domestic 
workers; there are workers who really are careless and irresponsible; who 
steal valuables and money; or who exploit their employers‟ trust in other 
ways. It would be wrong to ignore this side of the domestic worker issue. 
If we did, it could mean that employers would be less likely to listen to our 
views. We would then be seen as being biased, and that would make it 
difficult for us to talk and to hear from employers of domestic workers. 
Consequently, we needed to make the effort to acknowledge employer‟s 
complaints and recognize what was justified in them.
12
 
Such „employer complains‟ highlight the constructed opposition between the rights of the 
FDW and the employer‟s demands for a cheap and reliable household helper. The bulk of 
the problems faced by pro-FDW groups in Singapore are related to the perception that the 
championing of FDWs‟ economic, social and cultural rights may run counter Singapore‟s 
demand for low-wage labour. Concomitantly, an NGO representative has noted that 
Singapore‟s NGOs “cannot engage the ministries on moral terms (such as rights) but on 
technicalities.”13 On the advocacy front, this translates into a need for TWC2 to address 
the general resistance towards „migrant rights‟ through the group‟s usage of technical 
language; on the standardization and regulation of working hours and tasks, the 
recognition of domestic work under the Employment Act, and the institution of rest days 
as part of labour relations. Overall, the means deployed have been described by Pheng 
Cheah as “strategies of business management” that highlight the economic payoffs of a 
rest day that serve „national interests‟ and the provision of technical expertise to assist, 
and not contest, technocratic governance.
14
  
The move away from rights-based approaches is also reflected in the operational 
ethos of TWC2‟s biggest partner, the Humanitarian Organization for Migration 
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Economics (HOME). It was during her term as chairperson of the Archdiocese 
Commission for Migrants and Itinerant People (ACMI) that HOME‟s founder Bridget 
Lew began her work with migrant workers in 1997. Due to the sensitivity of pro-migrant 
activism in the Catholic Church because of its association with the „Marxist Conspiracy‟, 
Lew has often faced difficulties in convincing the church that pro-migrant activism needs 
to take on a stronger tone on rights. Lew eventually quit her position within the church 
after three years, and used her retirement funds to set up her own non-profit and secular 
NGO in 2004, citing her wish to avoid “all sorts of politics, including those in the 
church”.15 Unlike TWC2‟s emphasis on research and advocacy, HOME‟s initial emphasis 
was on direct service provision through the operation of shelters for FDWs. While there 
was some rivalry between TWC2 and HOME in the early formative years, the common 
concern on migrant issues and the functional specialization of both groups have provided 




The Dayoff.sg Campaign 
As a case study, the “Dayoff.sg” campaign in support of a legislated day-off for domestic 
workers was an early collaborative effort between between TWC2, HOME and UNIFEM 
Singapore in May 2008 to raise awareness on the welfare of FDWs in Singapore.
17
 The 
campaign validates domestic work as a profession that should be accorded the basic 
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labour rights of rest days and urges employers to discard the „maid‟ label in favour of the 
more dignified „domestic worker‟.18 Positioning FDWs as “productive individuals who 
make extremely valuable contributions to Singaporean society like any other worker,” 
and should enjoy a day off “to learn new skills, acquire knowledge and be empowered as 
individuals”, the campaign‟s moral message presents the FDWs individuals whose free 
time contributes economic benefits to Singapore.
19
 Furthermore, when employers are 
reminded that FDWs form part of the labour force that partake in jobs which locals shun, 
the campaign repositions FDWs‟ vulnerability as a form of market availability supporting 
national development. In its own words, the campaign “is really only asking people to 
treat others as they would wish to be treated themselves”, and the campaign has mounted 
a public education campaign which includes talks and partnerships with educational 
institutions, community groups and organizations.
 20
 The campaign has also launched a 
website to “allay the fears” and “burst the bubbles of myths” surrounding the 
consequences of giving a day-off.
21
 Concerns of domestic workers running away (thus 
forfeiting the employer‟s security deposit) or the worry that she will mix with “bad 
company” are met with the campaign‟s emphasis on trust, communication and kindness 
as regulatory discourses in the absence of legislation.
22
  
To support these appeals that TWC2 and HOME make on the employers, it is 
necessary for the groups to step up on direct services to improve the perception of FDWs 
by employers. At the women‟s shelter run by HOME which houses many FDWs awaiting 
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legal proceedings regarding errant employers, a strict curfew is imposed on their 
movements and a dress code is enforced to maintain their moral legitimacy. This is 
especially important for HOME‟s Executive Director, Jolovan Wham, who shared that 
because the shelter is situated near a residential estate, care must be exercised to manage 
neighbours‟ perceptions of HOME‟s shelter and FDWs in general. 23 To encourage an 
active lifestyle as these women await court proceedings or employment, they are urged to 
partake in cultural activities to occupy their free time. Beyond the pastoral care that is 
rendered by HOME‟s shelter for women, there are also technical interventions that 
attempt to improve their market position through skills training, and HOME has linked up 
with other welfare organisations to equip the women with competencies in English 
Language, micro-finance management, hairdressing and computer skills, to name a few.
24
 
For TWC2, the bulk of its direct services targeting FDWs has been rendered through the 
provision of a helpline service which has answered close to 2000 calls since its inception 
in 2006. The bulk of calls are from domestic workers seeking assistance and advice for 
the issues they encounter in their employment in Singapore.
25
 Besides the provision of 
emotional support, helpline volunteers are briefed to empower and educate migrant 
workers about their legal rights and entitlements under the employment laws in 
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Singapore, and to orientate their everyday behaviour to minimize conflict with their 
employers. The calls are then recorded into case files for monitoring and follow-up and 
the statistics are channelled towards TWC2‟s research reports for public advocacy. 
More recently, the emphasis on productivity has crosscut dominant ideas on 
health and work, and there have been discussions on the possibility of getting doctors 
onboard the initiative. Framed as a health issue, the day-off for FDWs is positioned as a 
step towards instilling „work-life harmony‟ for these women and the presence of doctors 
would lend medical credence to the movement‟s drive for rest days.26 
 
Fig. 3.1: A poster by TWC2 for its day-off campaign in 2009. Note the moral appeals in its presentation. 
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A major strategy of the campaign was thus to alter public perception about the moral 
obligation of employers in protecting these mobile but vulnerable women, while 
simultaneously training the FDW to fit within the ascribed identity scripts of domestic 
workers as docile, productive and chaste. This is helped by media reports of abuse cases 
which undermine citizens‟ impression of themselves as an „educated‟ and „caring‟ 
society.
27
 The ethical treatment of FDWs, often framed by the campaign as adopting an 
understanding of the FDW‟s „difficult position‟, is therefore pitched as a remedy for 
Singapore‟s tarnished face of „Asian‟ hospitality. Historically, this appeal to „Asian 
primordialism‟ within the region emerged as an ideological bulwark against the 
unfettered individualism blamed for the West‟s socio-economic decay.28 Projecting itself 
as a benevolent alternative of capitalism, Singapore employs the rhetoric of „Asian 
values‟ to foster ideological consensus for national development projects despite the 
attendant social dislocations. In claiming that wealth accumulation and competition need 
not be at odds with visions of a „caring‟ society, „Asian values‟ continues to ignore the 
plight of abused FDWs.
29
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Fig. 3.2: Selections from A Day Off photo exhibition by Sim Chi Yin, commissioned by TWC2 and 
exhibited between October and December 2003 at various locations island wide.  
Operating under the constraints of communitarianism, the dayoff campaign‟s attempts to 
reintroduce FDWs as legitimate subjects employs the same language of „benevolent 
development‟ as espoused by Asian values. Instead of calling stakeholders to task 
according to international charters, the circulation of discourses on „empathetic 
employers‟ and expressions of maid abuse as „national shame‟ become strategies to 
validate labour rights in the absence of state codification of these liberties.
30
 It may seem 
naïve to insist that such appeals to the morality of employers will generate substantial 
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improvements to the working conditions of FDWs given the power imbalance within the 
household, but such informal rules and ethical appeals are just as fundamental as the set 
of rights guaranteed by law, if the intention is to improve the welfare of FDWs. For 
Daniel Bell, it is important to emphasize this point only because “liberal-democratic 
theorists (and Western NGOs) are inclined to think, first and foremost, of legalistic 
conditions for securing the welfare of the vulnerable”.31 
However, as the success of the campaign is also contingent on its ability to stay 
within the discursive boundaries of „national interests‟ and failure to toe the line may 
result in backlashes for the NGOs. One example of this cost of transgression occurred 
prior to the Dayoff.sg campaign, where TWC2‟s own efforts in its “Sundays Off” 
campaign led to a series of closed-door dialogue sessions with the MOM in June and 
November 2003. Founding members Gee and Ho note that: 
The ministry was concerned that by highlighting some of the poorer 
examples of how domestic workers are treated in Singapore, TWC2 would 
be putting Singapore in a negative light on the international plane. It also 
expressed reservations about TWC2‟s proposal for tighter legislation to 
determine the working conditions of domestic workers in Singapore, 




Here, the governmental concern was that the media‟s involvement in TWC2‟s work had 
contravened national interests because it did not act within the state‟s formulation of civic 
society as a consultative partner; the group had made the government „lose face‟. While 
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TWC2 has been careful in presenting a non-confrontational front because its 
humanitarian efforts depend on closed-door networking with the authorities, the group 
was deemed to have overstepped the „OB markers‟ because such reports might tarnish 
Singapore‟s international image.33 Similarly, TWC2‟s public call for tighter legalisation 
through a standardized employment contract and the inclusion of FDWs under the 
Employment Act is met with the MOM‟s insistence that it would only consider 
regulatory aspects. The ministry‟s rebuttal in this case repeats its oft mentioned rhetoric 
that the economics of domestic labour as best managed according to the dictates of the 
free market and the special needs of each family, and that the state should not intervene 
in the domestic sphere of family matters.
34
  
In justifying itself in the face of mounting suspicion of its activities as „anti-
national‟ or as “acting as a trade union for FDWs in Singapore”35, TWC2 claims that its 
humanitarian actions mitigate the bias of foreign media: 
When TWC2 stretches out its hands to aggrieved FDWs, that gesture helps 
to moderate tension in the relationship. It helps to fight the prejudicial 
view that people in Singapore are bloody-minded or indifferent about the 
FDW‟s welfare.36 
By consistently framing their work as complementary to the national project, TWC2 got 
away with a mild rebuke in this episode, suggesting that state interests - both in 
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maintaining the welfare of FDWs for national development and in the protection of its 
international image – might be indirectly served by allowing the NGOs to moralize 
against employers through the local media.
37
 Consequently, the national project of 
making Singapore „a better place to live‟ is reaffirmed by TWC2‟s work on changing the 
mindsets of its citizens.  
 
‘Active Citizens’ and New Possibilities 
In 2004, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong‟s pledge towards a more „open society‟ called 
on citizens to partake in the building of a robust „civic society‟ as part of the 
government‟s vision of a modern Singapore.38 Ironically, the activities of archetypical 
„active citizens‟ within the Dayoff.sg campaign reveal tensions between the 
government‟s desire for an „active citizenry‟ and the advocative attempts by local 
activists on behalf of non-citizens. While the civic participation of the campaign 
volunteers may fulfil the national longing for a vigorous populace, their work often test 
the circumscribed parameters of state-sanctioned grassroots activities and feedback 
channels. Consequently, these groups commonly assert their public position as 
nationally-oriented civic society organisations, even if their work challenge hegemonic 
definitions of national development as „progressive‟ and „benevolent‟. Given the plethora 
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of state regulations and discourses that limit contentious forms of civic participation, it 
follows that the campaign strategy deliberately restrains its humanitarian efforts to the 
field of ethical interventions, and not channels of redress that often draw political 
scrutiny. In this sense, the work of TWC2 and HOME, dissolved of clearly enunciated 
rights-based discourses, fits the PAP‟s vision of civic society as a space inhabited by 
Singaporeans engaged in a consensual project of nation-building.
39
 
This is not to say that NGOs like TWC2 and HOME are predisposed to this form 
of civic activism; it should be highlighted here that the motivations behind the mission 
objectives of these groups are often products of internal contestations on how best to 
extend the humanitarian cause of migrant protection and the development of civil society 
in general. As President of Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) 
and veteran member of TWC2 Dana Lam notes, a „softer approach‟ may not necessarily 
be the best for social movements: 
In retrospect, as the campaign director, I believe we made a mistake in 
being too cautious with our focus on the plight of the domestic worker. We 
were trying to please too many people, the authorities, the public even. 
And, quite typically, thinking that a softer approach was for the better. In 
the end, I felt the campaign lacked the punch to put the message across 
clearly, and that is Stop Abuse of Foreign Domestic Workers! This may be 
how we can do things best in Singapore. But I think it‟s sad that a well-
intentioned citizens‟ initiative such as this should be so compromised.40  
 
So while they might be united under a cause, members often disagree on the means of 
achieving those objectives. On another occasion, this dilemma between an overtly 
politicised stance and a softer, cooperative relationship with the state threatened to split a 
newly formed TWC2 in early 2003. In a bid to forge as many partnerships it could in the 
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early stages of its formation, the proposal to partner with another civil society 
organisation, Think Centre, was tabled at a TWC2 meeting.
41
 Members eventually turned 
down the proposal on the grounds that Think Centre had been gazetted by the 
government as a political organisation, which TWC2 took to be a cautionary sign that 
they should be wary of being associated with. Following that meeting, past AWARE 
president and TWC2 member Constance Singam sent an appeal, asking members to 
revisit the decision as a “matter of principle”: 
We are a civil society movement with a fundamental responsibility (and 
something we all set out to do, even if not overtly expressed) to redefine 
the way we live and the values by which we live, be it social or political. 
We value democratic values, egalitarianism and inclusiveness. The maid 
issue/abuse is a tragic and extreme example of the lack of these values. 
The marginalisation of Think Centre is another example. Think Centre 
was gazetted a political organisation to starve them of foreign funds and as 
an example to other organisations. We, as a civil society movement, 
should not be party to its marginalisation.
42
 
A counter-position was offered by current president of TWC2, John Gee: 
Before anything else, [TWC2] was set up to improve the position of 
FDWs here, and we should be single-minded about this: whatever takes us 
towards that objective is to be welcomed and anything which impeded us 
in reaching our goal is not. This sounds ruthless, but the goal is good and 
we are employing legitimate means to attain it. We should not let 
ourselves be derailed by fighting other battles that we did not collectively 
decide were ours at the outset. And I must say, on points of principle, that 
I always feel much more comfortable with taking a stand for which I 
might have to pay a price than with taking one for which other people 
(chiefly foreign women workers, in this case) will pay. I hope that the 
Think Centre could be told quite frankly of our concerns and that it would 
agree to respect them by not pursuing the question of sponsorship. If we 
share a common concern for FDWs we should be able to put that [aside] 
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first and agree to find ways to cooperate fruitfully on the issue without 
jeopardising our chances of success.
43
 
While members eventually voted against the Think Centre‟s sponsorship by a 10-5 
majority, the issue raised a “pragmatism versus principles” debate over the development 
of civil society in general.
44
 Overall, the conservatism within the group reflects a fear of 
overstepping the „OB markers‟; TWC2 often engages in a process of self-regulation and 
are rewarded periodically for acting as partners of the state. This shift towards self-
regulation by NGOs has been described by Garry Rodan when he argues that repressive 
laws such as the ISA are of diminishing importance in a political system of extensive co-
optation.
45
 In their place, administrative law such as the Societies Act and the active 
wooing of activists under state patronage have become more effective means of 
regulation without the legitimacy backlashes associated with outright coercion.
46
 This has 
led Rodan to argue that Singapore possesses only “civil society forces”; a genuine civil 




Following the received wisdom that governments around the world are 
predisposed to oppression and civil society is the natural domain of liberty, Singapore is a 
„frustrating case‟ for many liberal observers. The conceptual and empirical difficulties of 
placing the city-state within the debate on democratisation arise from the legitimacy 
enjoyed by the PAP leadership through its untarnished record of electoral victories and its 
tendency to impose anti-democratic laws through the parliamentary system. According to 
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Chua, this steady state of „illiberal democracy‟ is compounded by an ambivalent 
electorate that is vocal about objectionable state intervention but unwilling to elect a new 
government.
48
 In this regard, the proposals by international bodies - articulated through 
the language of rights, rule of law and a strong civil society - lack political salience under 
the mechanisms of PAP hegemony.  
However, the conditions described above are by no means static. It is critical to 
note that this vacillation between acquiescence and resistance fit within the model of 
“political opportunity structure” for organizing social movements, where the scope for 
reforms occur in “protest cycles”.49 As part of a repertoire of political opportunities 
available, watershed events, such as grisly abuse cases, state opprobrium against 
dissidents, or the formalization of the government‟s own accountability rhetoric, can 
provide a stronger basis for NGOs to press for reforms. Conversely in more „settled‟ 
times, one can expect NGOs to pressure the public and government less on the terms of 
rights because of the political limitations on the rhetoric. Notably, when Singapore 
chaired ASEAN from August 2007 to July 2008, it has made clarifications to the ASEAN 
Charter in terms of good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms. As Gary 
Rodan notes, a political opportunity emerges for activist groups here by the government‟s 
own tacit acceptance of rights; “While translating this commitment into a concrete and 
workable institution remains a challenge, Singapore‟s divergence from many other 
Southeast Asian countries where national human rights bodies are in place or being 
contemplated has been highlighted.”50 Notwithstanding Singapore officialdom‟s 
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ambiguity with regards to rights, one must acknowledge that the inclusion of articles in 
the ASEAN Charter on Human Rights is significant in propelling the emergence of 
coalitional linkages among local rights-based organizations. 
The most visible outcome of these partnerships has been the Working Committee 
for an ASEAN Human Rights commission, dubbed MARUAH (“Dignity” in Malay), 
which counts migrant and feminist NGO veterans John Gee, Braema Mathi, and 
Constance Singham as its core leadership. Like TWC2 and HOME, MARUAH is 
cautious about the presentation of its public presence:  
MARUAH appreciates that human rights is still relatively new in the 
Singapore context. As such, we intend to approach the issue of human 
rights at an appropriate pace, with a PPP (public−private−people) model 
built around partnerships with multiple stakeholders. We will adopt 
appropriate approaches such as dialogues and negotiations, while 
remaining guided by and clear in our mission of observing the 
fundamental principles of human rights. As such, MARUAH will be 
mindful of the need for a non-partisan stance on human rights.
51
 
Despite its placid self-introduction, MARUAH has shown that it can adopt a critical 
stance on the formation of the ASEAN Human Rights Body (AHRB), charging 
governments to move beyond rhetoric and towards the substantive actualization of 
ASEAN‟s accountability platforms:  
While MARUAH appreciates the concepts of national sovereignty, non-
interference and responsibilities accompanying rights, and the existence of 
differing political systems and cultural traditions, we would emphasize 
that the aim of the ASEAN Charter is to transform ASEAN into a “rules-
based” entity and to “place the well-being, livelihood and welfare of the 
peoples at the centre of the community-building process in ASEAN”. 
These words must be supported by the necessary political will if they are 
to become reality, instead of remaining as mere lofty aspirations. The 
member states of ASEAN have to understand that the proposed AHRB to 
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be established under Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter has to stand for 
something, if these ideals in the ASEAN Charter are to be actualized.
52
 
While it is still early to assess MARUAH‟s work in the regional and national level, we 
can note the carving out of a space for rights, where the accountability of the government 
may now be questioned on those principles. On the other hand, activists are also keenly 
aware that the ASEAN Charter of Human Rights may slide down the slope of cultural 
relativism and become a regulatory discourse.  
In summary, this chapter has illustrated that TWC2 and HOME do not operate 
under ontologically stable notions of human rights and democracy, but deploy political 
tactics of situated ethics when strategically required. While they may protest against the 
abusive conditions of migrant employment from time to time with rights-based 
discourses and legal channels, they also perform the work of training and subjectification 
in tandem with national development, such as in the preparation and training of domestic 
workers for their employment and the reconfiguration of local mindsets on ethical 
treatment of foreign workers. Such connections to political and market forces and 
interaction with normative structures, often dismissed by critics as evidence of co-
optation and docility, allow us to view the pursuit of humanitarian causes as flexible 
manoeuvres on a political surface with no clear gains to be made from rights talk. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 





Reports of maid abuse cases in the Malaysian mainstream media highlight gaps where the 
goals of national development do not coincide with the rhetoric of a society that is 
„caring‟ and „ethical‟. While the reproductive labour performed by migrant women 
contributes towards Malaysia‟s rate of female citizen labour participation, FDWs remain 
susceptible to physical abuse, confinement, extended working hours and general 
xenophobia emanating from the host society.
1
 From June 2004 to August 2007, leading 
feminist group Tenaganita rescued 148 domestic workers and recorded 1050 instances of 
abuse, including rape, non-payment of wages and physical injury.
2
 Some observers have 
attributed this state of governmental inaction to Malaysia‟s foremost concern with 
economic development, diplomatic ties with other members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its domestic ethnic stability; all of which are said 
to be pursued at the expense of human rights and migrant integration.
3
  
Like Singapore, Malaysia‟s developmental drive produces two interdependent but 
asymmetrical subject-positions of a highly educated professional woman and the alien 
domestic worker that supports her. As discussed in Chapter 2, The vulnerability of the 
latter is enforced via an ethnicized and gendered system of hierarchical citizenship that 
ranks educated female citizens over FDWs in terms of their perceived worth in the 
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knowledge economy. The ethno-racial stigma against the foreign women intersects 
existing boundaries erected by middle-class families who are suspicious of the 
assimilation of FDWs into their households. Concomitantly, contradictions between 
perceptions of the FDW as a „contaminating other‟ and her role as family caregiver 
contribute to a complex exclusionary system of household surveillance. 
Table 4.1: Number of undocumented immigrants in Malaysia (1993-99)
4
 
Year Ops Nyah I Ops Nyah II Regularization* Voluntary 
Repatriation** 
Total 
1992   483 784  483 784 
1993 14 211 41 584   55 795 
1994 11 082 43 189   54 271 
1995 7 828 32 835   40 663 
1996 10 919 25 873 554 941  591 733 
1997 8 547 35 521 413 812  44 068 
1998 14 670 42 574  187 486 244 730 
1999 11 721 42 889   54 610 
Total 78 978 264 465 1 452 537 187 486 1 904 484 
* Regularization exercises in Peninsular Malaysia were carried between November 1991 and June 1992 
and between June and December 1996. In Sabah, the exercise was carried out between March and 
October 1997 and in Sarawak in January and March 1998. The results for Sarawak are not available. 
 
** Voluntary repatriation of undocumented migrants was carried out between 1 September and 15 
November 1998. 
 
At the national level, securitization discourses targeting foreigners are often deployed in 
times of public anxiety for the purposes of consolidating political legitimacy.
5
 For 
instance, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, Malaysia embarked on 
anti-foreigner witch-hunts named „Operasi Nyah‟ (literally „Operation Get Out‟) to 
repatriate undocumented migrants, and the majority of those deported were Indonesian 
FDWs. With routine raids and immigration policies that ensure the transience of 
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employment for foreigners, the influx of cheap foreign manpower can be engineered in 
times of economic need and then readily expelled in the tide of public xenophobia.  
Through the case study of Tenaganita, I review the state of activism on behalf of 
migrant women in Peninsular Malaysia and argue that the rights-based discourses 
employed by the group might be understood as modalities of governance, and not 
necessarily political liberalization, as earlier studies tend to suggest. Although migrant 
NGOs are keen to work with accepted definitions of rights as set out by international 
treaties and conventions and often operate as a „check and balance‟ mechanism on state 
administration, current research has tended to disregard instances where the NGOs also 
drive policies of national development and family building through the management of 
the FDW. In order to render protection to the FDW, migrant NGOs contend with 
gendered discourses on national development and ethno-racial politics that exclude her.  
This chapter argues that by presenting the FDW as economically valuable for the 
host society, by educating and regulating aspects of her health and productivity, NGOs 
like Tenaganita traverse the exclusionary parameters of race, class and nationality faced 
by FDWs. By redefining the ways in which „women‟, „domestic work‟, „human rights‟ 
and „national development‟ are projected within policies and practices circulated by the 
Malaysian state and resurgent Islam, the humanitarian efforts may be viewed as sites of 
augmentation that attempt to add value to the FDW‟s body by training and presenting her 
as industrious, chaste and docile. In this regard, the work of these humanitarian 
organizations may at times cooperate with, and not contest, dominant discourses on 
patriarchal citizenship and the economic interest in cheap manpower. 
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This is not to say that the rights framework is absent in the migrant advocacy 
groups of Malaysia, or that it simply becomes reformulated into dominant discourses rid 
of humanitarian impulses. On the contrary, I argue that when state-society cooperation 
breaks down, liberal eruptions of rights form one of the defining features of Malaysia‟s 
highly politicized civil society. Vis à vis Singapore‟s „milder‟ form of civic participation, 
where migrant groups avoid an overt human rights agenda, the frequent enunciation of 
rights claims in the Malaysian case studies reflect broader qualitative differences in the 
political culture of both countries. Unlike Singapore‟s ideology of multiracialism which 
presents the state as „transcultural‟ and above the particularism of ethnic or class-based 
identities,
6
 I argue that Malaysia‟s founding premise of Bumiputera rights cannot hold 
without implying the concurrent emergence of other forms of politicized identity and 
rights in the public imagination.  
 
Tenaganita: Constrained or Transgressive Contention? 
Established in 1991, Tenaganita (Women‟s Force) remains as the most visible migrant 
rights advocacy NGO in Malaysia.
7
 While originally formed to address the mounting 
problems faced by women employed in the electronics and plantation sectors, the surge in 
migration-related issues drove the group to include migrants as subjects of their aid. 
Today, Tenaganita carries out projects in four core areas, with a designated desk for the 
substantive focus on 1) Migrant Rights Protection, 2) Anti Trafficking in Persons, 3) 
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Combating Gender-Based Violence in Refugees, and 4) Women, Chemicals and the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO).
8
 These initiatives are carried out through a 
mixture of direct service provision of helplines, counselling and operating shelters, 
research and publication, legal support, public advocacy, closed–door discussions with 
state authorities and community-based interventions in health care and migrant 
empowerment.  
Tenaganita is not only concerned with specific issues affecting women but also 
committed to issues of democracy, justice and equality in Malaysia, and have participated 
in joint campaigns and forums. Co-founder Dr. Irene Fernandez was the Foundation 
President of All Women‟s Action Society (AWAM), the founder of the coalitional 
Women‟s Development Collective and also a founding member of Malaysia‟s forefront 
human rights organization, SUARAM (Suara Rakyat Malaysia, “The People‟s Voice”). 
At the regional level, Tenaganita enjoys close ties with CARAM Asia (Coordination of 
Action Research on AIDS and Mobility), which is a coalition of regional organizations 
engaged in action-research on the health aspects of migration.
9
 Tenaganita members were 
also past executives of the Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law, and Development 
(APWLD), a regional NGO that facilitates the access to justice and equality for women.
10
 
These cross-national linkages and coalitional networking underscores Tenaganita‟s 
willingness to address the transnational nature of migrant labour exploitation through a 
rights-based critique on the neoliberal economic order; a significant difference from 
                                                 
8
 Interview with Aegile Fernandez, Program Coordinator, Tenaganita, 6 January 2009. 
9
 Presentation by Cynthia Gabriel, Regional Coordinator, CARAM Asia, at the Bar Council Conference on 
Developing a Comprehensive Framework for Migrant Labour, 18-19 February 2008, Crystal Crown 
Hotel, Petaling Jaya. 
10
 Lyons, 2006: 12. 
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Singapore‟s „milder‟ migrant groups who often frame their activism in national terms.11 
In her acceptance speech to the 2005 Right Livelihood Awards, Fernandez opined that: 
“We must change the rules of the global economy, for it is the logic of global capitalism 
that is the source of the disruption of society and of the environment. The challenge is 
that even as we deconstruct the old, we dare to imagine and win over people to our 
visions and programs for the new.”12 
While Malaysia has not endorsed many international rights conventions, these 
standards are often cited by Tenaganita as established practices and general norms that 
are widely accepted regardless of governmental ratification.
13
 However, Tenaganita‟s 
rights-based approach is constantly attenuated by the threat of legal coercion and the 
limits on counter-hegemonic visions of Malaysian modernity. The 1987 Operasi Lalang 
(“Weeding Operation”) clampdown on civil society organizations, where 106 persons, 
including many opposition leaders and social activists, were detained under the Internal 
Security Act as suspected “Marxists”, continues to haunt activists today.14 The dangers 
associated with the Societies Act have also pressed Tenaganita to conduct itself as a non-
profit business registered under the less restrictive Companies Act. Nonetheless, this 
refuge proved to be superficial when the director of the Malaysian Registry of Companies 
                                                 
11
 Interview with Aegile Fernandez, 6 January 2009. A clear sign is Tenaganita‟s classification of FDWs as 
“trafficked”, because of the lack of legal protection whilst in Malaysia. Similarly in May 2006, when the 
Malaysian and Indonesian governments had finally resolved to institute a statement on minimum 
standards relating to recruitment and employment of Indonesian FDWs in Malaysia, Tenaganita‟s (2006) 
critical transnational perspective precipitated a scathing press statement, lambasting both governments 
for “abdicat[ing] their responsibility of protecting and upholding the rights of young women moving to 
be domestic workers.”  
12
 Fernandez, 2005; emphasis mine. 
13
 These include the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families, Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness (MWG-JUMP, 2009: 2). 
14
 Interview with John Liu, SUARAM, 1 January 2009. 
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raided the premises of Tenaganita in January 1997 “seemingly because the government 
was upset about the bad press it received for condoning the attack on the East Timor 
Conference”.15 Irene Fernandez herself had been the target of state sanctions when she 
was embroiled in a high profile court case over Tenaganita‟s criticisms of Malaysia‟s 
detention centres. The co-founder of Tenaganita was charged under section 81(A) of the 
Newspapers and Printing Presses Act on the allegation that her 1995 memorandum, 
“Abuse, Torture and Dehumanized Treatment of Migrant Workers at Detention Camps,” 
had propagated falsehoods about the government. She was acquitted in November 2008, 




Although Tenaganita‟s fiery accountability campaigns have been well 
documented, little has been said about its appeal on non-legalistic, instrumental grounds 
that the protection of migrant women is beneficial for the host country. Especially where 
the political independence of civil society groups comes with a hefty price in Malaysia, 
and when problems are better addressed by state action, it is naïve to expect Tenaganita 
to maintain a position that completely abstains itself from linking up with the 
government. In forming relations with state agencies as experts on issues of trafficking, 
immigration enforcement and in the training and subjectification of FDWs as motors of 
the Wawasan 2020 vision, Tenaganita‟s role as an arbiter in „nation building‟ cannot be 
overstated.  
                                                 
15
 Gurowitz, 2000: 872. 
16
 “Activist Irene Fernandez acquitted,” The Sun, 24 November 2008. 
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These initiatives include a „drop-in‟ counselling centre where employers can leave 
domestic workers in the care of Tenaganita, where skills training and „empowerment‟ 
workshops conducted for FDWs in order to augment their value within a knowledge 
economy.
17
 As I have argued earlier for Singapore‟s „Dayoff.sg‟ campaign, these extra-
legal interventions allow NGOs to validate labour rights state recognition of these 
liberties have not been forthcoming. Especially important where regulatory systems 
governing domestic work are vague, such appeals made on economic instrumentality of 
„productive‟ FDWs and the morality of „caring‟ and „modern‟ employers can contribute 
to the protection of FDWs without drawing political scrutiny associated with rights talk. 
This is not to say that both strands of activism are mutually exclusive; like TWC2 in 
Singapore, Tenaganita deploys both in varying degrees according to strategic gains.
18
 As 
an example, in October 2008, Tenaganita inaugurated the campaign to “recognize 
domestic work as work with one paid day off to reduce abuse against domestic workers”:  
Today‟s campaign focuses on the right to a paid day of for all domestic 
workers in the country especially “stay in” domestic workers.  A day off 
from the employer and the family will bring positive results to both the 
family and the worker.  The domestic worker is a human being with social 
needs like the need for friends. The off day can also be an opportunity for 
the worker to improve herself and her skills. A paid off day is a right. It is 
human. It brings about a space for renewal for the domestic worker. […] 
The campaign calls for the recognition of domestic worker as 
worker. Currently the Employment Act defines her as a servant.  The word 
servant is degrading.  It implies subjugation and a person who serves at all 
times.  It is only when we recognize her as a domestic worker, will we 
protect her rights and uphold her dignity.   The absence of a standardized 
contract, no off days, abuse, long hours of work and passports held by 
                                                 
17
 Interview with Aegile Fernandez, 6 January 2009. These courses include computer training, hairdressing, 
cooking courses, how to set up businesses, accounting, etc. 
18
 I am skeptical of Ong‟s (2006: 212) claim that “only by invoking cultural understanding and compassion, 
not abstracts rights discourse, can the moral legitimacy of alien women‟s bio-security be persuasive to 
the host society.” I say so because rights discourses have a moral character; NGOs can invoke human 
rights as legal status and as cultural appeals on the moral worthiness of vulnerable women. The legal and 
moral aspects of rights are not as distinct as Ong makes them out to be. 
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employers all contribute to a condition of bonded labour and servitude. It 
is trafficking in persons for labour under the Anti trafficking in Persons 




An ethical appeal is made to employers here to consider the situation of the FDW and 
how her welfare will bring “positive results to both the family and the worker.” Where 
political elites have called for the banning of FDWs on the grounds that cultural 
differences in childrearing would lead to a poor-upbringing of children in the household, 
Tenaganita reminds employers that raising children up in an abusive household is an 
equally appalling pedagogical environment. As enlightened Malaysians whose status as 
members of affluent society depends on the productivity and protection of less affluent 




      
 Fig. 4.2: “Positive and Negative” posters for Tenaganita‟s day-off campaign 
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 “Dayoff campaign press release,” Tenaganita, 19 October 2008, emphasis mine. 
20
 Aegile Fernandez explains how the moral rhetoric of the campaign works: “We relate it [the day off 
issue] to their [FDW employers] own work and ask them to think about their position in the company 
they work for. If their employers ask them to work on Saturdays and Sundays, what would be their 
reactions? Then we link it to the domestic worker at their home, she is like you, a worker and yet she 
does not enjoy a day off which you take for granted.” Interview with Aegile Fernandez, 6 January 2009. 
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In speaking to a regional NGO on the political strategies of Tenaganita, Irene 
Fernandez acknowledges that a rights-based approach is only contingently deployed 
because there needs to be a balance between accountability strategies and public 
„sensitization‟: 
If you come out right away and say we are talking about a HRBA (human 
rights based approach) then I feel that sometimes you are in trouble. It‟s 
the way in which you approach it. […] We must first sensitize the 
government before we can lobby them. We must help them to understand 
the difference between prostitution and trafficking. I think that in the 
minds of the authorities the moment that you say trafficking they think 
that it‟s prostitution. While we are sensitizing them we bring to their 
attention the fact that there are laws and Conventions in place. We 
question why the state is not using them. It is always the victims and not 
the traffickers that face legal action. The long-term approach shouldn‟t be 




While „sensitization‟ can be taken to mean either reminding officials of the violations 
they have chosen to gloss over, or to enter into a diplomatic conciliation with the 
authorities, it is clear to Fernandez that rights-based accountability rhetoric and the 
language of negotiation and consultation are not at odds with one another. Where 
Tenaganita differs from TWC2 is its willingness and ability to enact rights-based 
mechanisms, even if both groups agree that “the long term approach shouldn‟t be just to 
lobby the state”. One way to view this „diplomatic‟ underside of rights activism is to 
consider Tenaganita‟s willingness to „play by the rules‟ as a partner of the state, and to 
work in a consultative manner with state authorities. Tenaganita‟s Programme 
Coordinator and Co-Founder Aegile Fernandez explains that: 
Our relationship with the police is very good. We have given training for 
police investigating officers on gender sensitization, domestic workers and 
trafficking. So that has opened us up to work better. So now they do 
                                                 
21
 Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women Alliance, 2004: 65-8. 
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referrals or they call us for advice, and we can call them for assistance in 
case we need some help on a case file immediately. This has also led to 
the police headquarters setting up a special unit for trafficking and we 
work with this special unit. […] We help in investigation and translation 
and sometimes we house them first before they go to the governmental 
shelters. […] We also give them a lot of information on defaulting agents 





In working with the police, Tenaganita is able to render protection to FDWs and 
prosecuting errant employers much more efficiently than if it were to choose to abstain 
from interacting with the authorities. Nevertheless, the level of cooperation and 
consultation with other state agencies, such as the Human Resources Ministry, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and the Immigration Department, remains ad-hoc and strained. 
Especially where conditions are marked by malaise and official inaction, Tenaganita 
would then “go one step higher” and invoke accountability rhetoric, either through 
international rights or rule of law to effect changes. 
 
Fig. 4.3: An example of Tenaganita‟s „expertise relations‟ with the Royal Malaysian Police in Malacca. 
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Fig. 4.4: Police officers lining up for an ice-breaker game during the training. 
 
 
Fig. 4.5: Tenaganita‟s booth at 2008‟s “Fiesta Femina: Young Women's Carnival” 






Fig. 4.6: Women from Tenaganita‟s shelter performing at “Track of Talents”, a monthly song and dance 
event organized by Eagle Point Church in Puchong, Selangor, 10 November 2008. 
 
Critics accustomed to the view that the civil society groups‟ „consensual‟ or „co-
opted‟ approach have no impact on progressive social change, tend to celebrate rights talk 
and accountability systems as producing visible and immediate results.
23
 They tend to 
note Tenaganita‟s firm emphasis on the conventions and standards that should protect the 
FDW, but often without acknowledging that the group draws upon strands of extra-legal 
interventions in working with the state, and in morally appealing to stakeholders without 
a clear recourse to rights-based discourses. Notably, my interviews with Aegile 
Fernandez suggest that while the option of calling the state to task according to rights-
based instruments is important, the strategy of lobbying comes only after failed attempts 
at „sensitizing‟ the authorities during closed-door dialogues: 
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 For instance, the human rights campaigns in Malaysia typically use similar tactics of public education, 




In the past [the ministries] never used to engage us, they just keep quiet. 
Lately, after the Prime Minister (Abdullah Badawi) has said that there 
must be some kind of working relationship between the government and 
NGOs, things have changed. This was last year (2008), he said that civil 
groups must be engaged, and now at least we see that letters are coming 
back to say they are looking into the cases. That is important for us 
because we can hold them accountable. We can put down who is the case 
officer, how many times did we call through to the Immigration 
Department for this case, what is the response, and then we send a letter 
with all this information and copy this to the Prime Minister‟s Office if 
nothing is done. We even attach the PM‟s speech to the letter so he 
remembers what he said about working together. […] So we quote the 
laws, we quote international conventions, ILO (International Labour 
Organisation) and all that; what Malaysia has signed. We can go one step 
higher, we file a complaint at ILO because Malaysia now is also in the 
United Nation‟s Human Rights Council. Or we file a complaint at the 
International Union or the ICC (Institutions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights) Sub-Committee on Accreditation to 
downgrade SUHAKAM‟s status. So for a number of cases the UN (United 
Nations) has written to them. This is why they are very upset with us 
because they have to reply to it; they call us troublemakers! 
 
In this regard, we must maintain skepticism towards the idea that NGOs are non-reflexive 
adherents to rights talk. As seen in the case of Tenaganita, the vocabulary of rights is 
merely a guideline and not a rule on the possible courses of political action; the group 
interprets and formulates their application according to gains that can be made with/out 
the discourse of rights. Tenaganita‟s strategy of forging working relationships with state 
agencies before invoking accountability rhetoric is significant in this respect.  
 
The Fruits of Contention? 
In June 2009, the government of Malaysia agreed to institute a standardized contract for 
FDWs in Malaysia, which include provisions on salary, workplaces and day-offs. 
Minister of Human Resources Datuk Dr. S. Subramaniam was reported to have said that 
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the new provisions will be worked into Malaysia‟s Employment Act, and surprise checks 
will be conducted to ensure the welfare of FDWs.
24
 However, employers and FDW 
agencies were mixed in their reception to the policy amendments; news reports 
highlighted the concerns of employers of „runaway‟ FDWs, and that the provisions were 
„sound in principle‟ but difficult to enforce in reality. Furthermore, the event is also far 
from the complete professionalization of domestic service as envisioned by the campaign, 
because the stipulated day-off is subject to mutual agreement between employer and 
employee and FDWs can „agree‟ to receive money in lieu of the day-off. However, in 
securing the government‟s commitment to legislative amendments at the very least, 
NGOs campaigning on behalf of FDWs can nonetheless call employers to task for 
violations against the terms specified in the standardized contract. Even so, NGOs 
involved in the campaign are mindful that the implementation for such changes are 
dependent on the careful and constant management of public opinion, especially with 
regards to the newfound entitlements of ethno-racial foreigners in times of economic 
uncertainty, and the members within Tenaganita and the CARAM Asia network agreed 
internally to address the public objections raised to the proposed amendment.
25
 It is also 
unclear whether these proposed amendments surfaced as a result of the efforts of the 
lobbying efforts of NGOs, or as a result of the larger climate of accountability arising 
with the rhetoric of reform by a newly appointed Prime Minister.  
                                                 
24
 “Maids to get one day off, govt to make surprise checks” The Star, 16 June 2009. 
25
 See “Many against day-off for maids,” in The Star, 18 June 2009. In an internally circulated email among 
sympathizers to the day-off campaign, Vivian Chong of CARAM Asia ([n.d.]) notes that „We plan to 
draft a statement to laud the move and also to ward off objections from agencies and employers that was 
already reported in another news at the bottom.” 
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With these issues considered, it becomes difficult to ascertain whether the 
Tenaganita‟s overt rights-based approach to the day-off campaign is more efficacious 
than TWC2‟s less confrontationary stance. In asking how universal human rights impact 
domestic policies on FDWs in Malaysia and Singapore, quick answers are often 
imprecise for us to assess the political situation. For one, we can look to the strong 
presence of rights-based groups and increased activism in Malaysia and argue that there 
has been substantial headway made on those terms. Turning to the political suspicion of 
universal rights by governments espousing „Asian values‟, we can similarly say that 
social change on the basis of rights, unless state-initiated, has had limited influence in 
both countries. What both of these formulations miss is that while international norms do 
have an impact, their efficacy emerges in locally specific ways. This preceding discussion 
has demonstrated the terrain of interaction within which a whole range of rights are social 
constructed and enacted. Whether international conventions or more locally specific 
appropriations of rights guaranteed in legislation and accountability platforms, the 
utilization of rights based mechanisms offers no clear emancipatory outcomes because it 
can simultaneously constrain and enable activism on behalf of female migrant workers. 
 
   
CHAPTER FIVE 
 





As a question of resource allocation between different cultural collectives, the fulfilment 
of economic, social and cultural rights for one group within a nation-state may come at 
the expense of another, despite the liberal ideal of rights as universal. In reality, where the 
political language of rights has been successfully used by international NGOs in securing 
the entitlements of migrants, local NGOs often have to strategize around constraints 
(such as „Asian Values‟) on how best to extend their humanitarian goals. This is 
especially so in the context of some Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia and 
Singapore, where rights talk can be more of an impediment than an enabler, given certain 
conservative political environments that are suspicious of rights as articulations of 
western imperialism.
1
 On the other hand, the question of citizenship is of less importance 
for lower skilled workers than their labour rights, partly due to their common experience 
of unpaid wages, lack of day-offs and their transient nature as temporary workers. 
Despite these problems, it is in this context of inequalities in access to citizenship status 
and rising incidence of temporary and return migration, that a call for a “transnational 
approach to migrant rights” has been made.2 
 
                                                 
1
 Chua (2003) has written extensively on the constrained civil society and the limitations on liberal rights in 
the context of Singapore. For a comparison between Malaysia and Singapore‟s approach to the question 
of human rights activism by civil society, see Rodan, 2009. 
2
 Piper 2008: 290. 
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This thesis has reviewed the attempts by Tenaganita and TWC2 in addressing 
some of the complexities surrounding rights and citizenship regimes. I have suggested 
thus far that citizenship in our epoch is increasingly marked by modalities of governance 
that not only normalize social behaviour, they also constitute the social positions the 
agent inhabits. The discussion on the modernizing discourses of developmentalist 
Malaysia and Singapore in Chapter 2 is an attempt to illustrate precisely how these 
inscriptions variously mark and engender the collective particulars of „women‟ and 
„maids‟ according to a hierarchy of citizenship that ultimately marginalizes the latter. In 
highlighting the historical and geographical contingency in which these positions are 
constituted, it is similarly to reveal that universal rights claims made via these politicized 
identities often disregard the specificity in which those positions are brought into being.  
To the detriment of liberal multiculturalists, however, the insistence on an 
unencumbered person who can be endowed with rights is untenable, because the same 
individual is bounded by the cultural practices of the larger social unit of community 
which constitutes who s/he is.
3
 As liberal multiculturalism assumes that the individual 
seeking recognition is able to transcend the ascription of identity markers in an asocial 
capacity, it is ill-equipped to account for the paradox that while rights are conferred to 
atomized, depoliticized individuals, the claims to these entitlements are primarily made 
by politically defined communities. To enjoy rights, the individual is therefore obligated 
to conduct oneself responsibly to coordinate social life with other group members, so that 
the constitution of the collective group is not disrupted.
4
  
                                                 
3
 Ibid.: 173. 
4
 Appiah, 1994: 159-160. 
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This is the challenge faced by marginalized groups in Malaysia and Singapore, 
where the continued ascription of identities onto various subject-categories of ethnicity, 
class, gender and nationality today means that individuals do not have the freedom, as 
presumed by liberal multiculturalism, to select from a myriad of possible identity scripts 
for public recognition.
5
 As Daniel Goh argues, “The presumption of prepublic cultural 
identity by liberal multiculturalism does not therefore work in postcolonial societies 
where state recognition ascribes one‟s primary identity and leaves out the others as 
private and irrelevant to the making of public demands, rendering these irrelevant 
identities morally problematic and even politically seditious if they do make public 
demands.”6 In looking at the respective campaign efforts of TWC2 and Tenaganita, one 
might similarly ask: what happens to the FDW, if her ascribed identity - as „foreign‟, 
„female‟, and „unskilled‟– dismisses her from making public demands in the language of 
rights? What happens on a broader level, if the rights so desired by the individual redraw 
the configurations of power that enact his/her subordination? And how should civil 
society mobilize on behalf of these women, if these presupposed rights are disallowed 
public articulation? 
The data presented in this thesis do suggest that Tenaganita and TWC2 are keen 
to adopt the language of universal human rights and make reference to international 
labour and humanitarian standards in their work. Despite the value of such tools, the 
recourse to rights is not always a clear and easy choice for NGOs.In postcolonial 
societies, identities are sutured together from a multitude of ethno-racial, gendered and 
classed positions as ascriptive categories for racial governmentality. In this formulation, 
                                                 
5
 Chua, 2005: 174-5. 
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political emancipation on the terms of the rights of „inherent personhood‟ become highly 
problematic (if not seditious) articulations because they aim to transcend these pre-
constructed categories that facilitate hegemonic governance. Where the state‟s 
constructed „universality‟ achieves fixedness, as the case with Singapore, it is able to 
demarcate claims external to itself as particularistic and thus in competition with the 
interests of the national collective. By extension, the discussion in Chapter 3 points to the 
nationally oriented character of TWC2‟s civic activism as a strategic adaptation to the 
governmental regime, seeking recognition for the subjugated constituency of FDWs but 
without overtly invoking rights. Concomitantly in Malaysia, where the state‟s 
particularity is visible through its support of Malay primacy, the efforts of Tenaganita 
gain latitude in that the state‟s foil of universality cannot be sustained without 
commitment to equal rights for others. By emphasizing the rights of those not captured in 
the national imaginary, the rights-based stance of Tenaganita calls the state to task for its 
protection of Malay rights despite its constitutional multiracialism.  
What the examples of TWC2 and Tenaganita share is the less observed modality 
of governmentality which both groups deploy to garner protection for the FDWs. It is 
commonly presumed that the state is separate and distinct from civil society, and so state 
fragmentation (or withdrawal from politcal spaces) is one variable cited by observers 
when measuring political agency within the two countries. However, I have argued that 
the size and „vibrancy‟ of civil society do not guarantee political liberalization because 
they are similarly sites of normalization and governance that train the FDWs for inclusion 
into the body-politic. In highlighting the ways in which the protection of FDWs can be 
                                                                                                                                                 
6
 Goh, 2007: 243. 
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garnered through „expertise relations‟ and moral interventions, I have argued that the 
capacity for political agency is entailed not only in resistance but also in the ways in 
which FDWs and movements themselves are made to inhabit the ostensibly „oppressive‟ 
norms.  
 
Conclusion: Freedom as a Practice 
For readers accustomed to the enabling character of rights-based instruments carried by 
civil society, the critique that such projects are not inherently emancipatory is a deeply 
unsettling proposition. Indeed, one of the most common refrains from liberal quarters 
about the critique of rights is that it is negating practice that fails to offer instructive 
guidance on social change. Typical charges range from being academic, impractical, 
intellectually indulgent, or insensitive to the political urgencies at hand – in short, critique 
is of no relevance in the Real World. But in the haste to discover the „practical‟ political 
tools, I am less confident that the normative nature of rights talk can be overlooked when 
deploying them for urgent political demands. Temporally, where rights become an 
indisputable emancipatory force in history, such as the American Civil Rights movement, 
in other times rights become a hollow promise or a regulatory discourse to undermine 
radical political forces.
7
 Spatially, where rights empower individuals in one social 
location, such as property rights which support the power of landlords and capital, it may 
disempower those in other locations, especially in creating the subjects of „tenant‟ and 
„worker‟.  
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 Bell, 1992; Bumiller, 1992. 
  
83 
None of this is to suggest that those without rights in a world penetrated by 
notions of civil liberties should abandon the endeavour to attain and use them. I am not 
suggesting that the female migrant worker‟s vulnerability to abuse and sexual violence, 
her economic subordination and her lack of reproductive freedom vanishes simply 
because we cannot attach who or what the „female migrant worker‟ is to the stable 
category of a sovereign individual. My preoccupation in this study was problematize the 
separation between state and civil society and the normative nature of rights; it is not a 
recommendation that our progressive efforts should remain entrenched in the status quo.  
The examples of Tenaganita and TWC2 remind us about the importance of 
comprehending the diffused character of power in our age. The sensitivity to the situated 
utility of rights discourses, the strategy of fusing humanitarian protection with the 
instrumentality of „national interests‟ through subject formation, the blurring of state-
society boundaries, and the strategic invocation of rights; all these allow us to envision 
humanitarian work as a constant negotiation of political claims and counterclaims 
without recourse to a normative position. When we begin to understand that there is no 
permanent division between political recognition and exclusion, but only diverse forms of 
political claims and strategies of struggle, we similarly appreciate that there are no clear 
victories, but only constant political manoeuvres undertaken for the emancipation of 
those oppressed.  
Freedom is, after all, a practice. 
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PERMOHONAN PAS LAWATAN (KERJA SEMENTARA) 
PEMBANTU RUMAH ASING (SENARAI SEMAK) 
 
Permohonan : Baru / Gantian / Lain-lain (Nyatakan: ________________)  
 
1. Borang permohonan baru (PRA 1) / gantian (PRA 2) 
2.  Borang IM.12 (permohonan Pas Lawatan)  
3.  Borang IM.38 (permohonan untuk visa)  
4.  Personal Bond yang dimatikan setem RM10.00  
5.  Perjanjian Pekerjaan oleh pembantu rumah asing yang dimatikan setem 
RM10.00 (Dalam 4 salinan)  
6.  Salinan kad pengenalan suami dan isteri  
7.  Salinan pasport pembantu rumah asing  
8.  Laporan perubatan bakal pembantu rumah asing dari negara asal oleh panel 
klinik yang dilantik Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia.  
9.  Borang Perakuan Pengambilan Pembantu Rumah Asing Beragama Islam 
(Lampiran A) dan Borang Perakuan Pembantu Rumah Asing Beragama 
Islam bagi majikan yang menggaji PRA beragama Islam (Lampiran B).  
10.  Borang Perakuan Daripada Majikan Yang Tidak Menggunakan Agensi 
Berdaftar bagi majikan yang mengemukakan permohonan secara individu 
(Lampiran C).  
11.  Pengesahan pekerjaan dan bukti pendapatan tetap suami isteri.  
12.  Dokumen sokongan tujuan permohonan PRA (seperti sijil kelahiran anak, 
pengesahan pegawai perubatan mengenai keluarga sakit).  
13.  Sijil perkahwinan (bagi permohonan kali pertama sahaja).  
 
Makluman: Dokumen sokongan Bil. 11 dan 12 tidak perlu dikemukakan bagi 
permohonan gantian PRA yang dibuat dalam tempoh 6 bulan dari tarikh surat kelulusan 
sebelum ini.  
 
PERHATIAN: Kenyataan ini adalah benar dan saya sedar sepanjang Laporan/ 
Kenyataan/ Represtasi palsu adalah merupakan satu kesalahan di bawah Sek. 56 (1) (f) 
Akta Imigresen 1959/63 dan boleh dikenakan denda tidak melebihi RM10,000.00 atau 
penjara tidak melebihi 5 tahun atau kedua-duanya sekali.  
 
Sekian, terima kasih. 
 
TANDATANGAN PEMOHON: ..........................................  




APPLICATION FOR VISITOR PASS (TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT) 
FOREIGN DOMESTIC WORKER (CHECKLIST) 
 
Application: New/Replacement/others (state: _______________) 
 
1. New application form (PRA 1) / replacement (PRA 2) 
2. Form IM.12 (Application for Visitor Pass) 
3. Form IM.38 (Application for visa) 
4. Personal Bond with stamp duty RM10.00 
5. Worker‟s Contract by Foreign domestic worker with stamp duty RM10.00 (In 4 
copies) 
6. Copy of identification card of husband and wife 
7. Copy of passport of foreign domestic worker 
8. Medical report from country of origin obtained at a clinic appointed by the Ministry 
of Health Malaysia for prospective foreign domestic worker. 
9. Certification form for employment of Muslim foreign domestic worker (Annex A) 
and Certification form for employers that employ Muslim foreign domestic workers 
(Annex B).  
10. Certification form from employer filing an independent application, without reliance 
on a registered agency (Annex C).  
11. Letter of Employment and Statement of income of husband and wife 
12. Supporting documents for the application for foreign domestic worker (such as birth 
certificate, official declaration by medical official for members of family with 
ailments)  
13. Marriage Certificate (for first time applications only)  
  
Additional Information: Supporting document (no 11 and 12) do not have to be 
provided for application to replace foreign domestic worker within 6 months from the 
date of previous approval. 
 
NOTICE: The declaration is true and I acknowledge that making false 
report/statement/acknowledgement is considered a crime under section 56 (1) (f) 
Immigration Act 1959/63 and is punishable to not more than RM 10, 000.00 or 
imprisonment not more than 5 years or both. 
 
Thank you.  
  
Signature of applicant: ..........................................  







JABATAN IMIGRESEN MALAYSIA  
GARIS PANDUAN & SYARAT-SYARAT PENGAMBILAN  
PEMBANTU RUMAH ASING (PRA)  
 
1. Permohonan Pas Lawatan (Kerja Sementara) (PL(KS)) Pembantu Rumah Asing (PRA) boleh dibuat oleh 
majikan sendiri atau melalui agensi pekerjaan yang berdaftar dengan Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia di 
pejabat Imigresen Negeri mengikut alamat majikan.  
 
2. Majikan perlu memastikan Borang Permohonan beserta dokumen yang diperlukan adalah lengkap 
sebelum dikemukakan ke Pejabat Imigresen Negeri.  
 
3. Majikan mesti terdiri daripada suami atau isteri yang mempunyai anak berumur bawah 15 tahun yang 
perlu perhatian dan jagaan atau ibu bapa yang sakit/uzur.  
 
4. Suami dan isteri majikan mestilah bekerja dan hanya satu (1) pembantu rumah asing yang layak 
dipohon untuk satu keluarga.  
 
5. Jumlah pendapatan bulanan majikan yang hendak menggajikan PRA Filipina dan Sri Lanka hendaklah 
tidak kurang RM5,000.00 dan bagi PRA Indonesia, Thailand dan Kemboja ialah tidak kurang dari 
RM3,000.00.  
 
6. Majikan yang telah diisytiharkan muflis oleh pihak berkuasa tidak layak mendapat kemudahan PRA.  
 
7. Majikan yang mempunyai alasan yang kukuh dan pendapatan mengikut syarat yang ditetapkan oleh 
Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia dibenarkan memohon pembantu rumah asing kedua.  
 
8. Bakal PRA mestilah perempuan, terdiri daripada warganegara Indonesia, Thailand, Kemboja, Filipina 
ataupun Sri Lanka serta berumur tidak kurang daripada 21 tahun dan tidak melebihi 45 tahun dan 
disahkan sihat oleh pusat-pusat perubatan yang dilantik.  
 
9. Majikan beragama Islam dibenarkan menggaji PRA beragama Islam sahaja.  
 
10. Bakal PRA mestilah berada di negara asal dan masuk/datang ke Malaysia menggunakan Visa Dengan 
Rujukan (VDR) yang diambil di pejabat perwakilan Malaysia di negara berkenaan.  
 
11. Majikan dikehendaki membuat pemeriksaan kesihatan bagi PRA di Fomema Sdn. Bhd. sebaik tiba di 
negara ini dan mendapatkan endosment PL(KS) di Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia Negeri yang 
meluluskannya dalam masa 1 satu bulan dari tarikh tiba.  
 
12. Pembantu rumah asing yang gagal pemeriksaan kesihatan tidak dibenarkan bekerja dan majikan perlu 
mengurus penghantaran pulang segera dengan mendapatkan Memo Periksa Keluar dari Jabatan 
Imigresen Malaysia.  
 
13. Majikan hendaklah memastikan PRA ditugaskan untuk membuat kerja-kerja rumah sahaja (tidak 
termasuk cuci kereta).  
 
14. Majikan dimestikan menyediakan kemudahan bilik/tempat tinggal yang sesuai kepada PRA lengkap 
dengan kemudahan asas dan makanan yang berkhasiat. PRA juga hendaklah diberi rehat secukupnya 
termasuk waktu tidur sekurang-kurangnya 8 jam sehari.  
 
15. Majikan bukan Islam yang menggaji PRA yang beragama Islam mestilah menghormati sensitiviti agama 
PRA dengan membenarkan PRA melakukan ibadah seperti sembahyang 5 waktu, puasa bulan 
Ramadhan dan tidak disuruh melakukan kerja-kerja rumah yang bertentangan dengan agama Islam.  
 
16. Majikan hendaklah maklum bahawa PRA tidak dibenarkan berkahwin dengan rakyat tempatan, rakyat 




17. Majikan hendaklah maklum bahawa PRA tidak dibenarkan membuat Permohonan Permit Masuk semasa 
memegang PL(KS).  
 
18. Majikan hendaklah memastikan PRA tidak bertukar pekerjaan/sektor atau bertukar majikan tanpa 
kebenaran dari Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia.  
 
19. Lanjutan tempoh PL(KS) hendaklah dikemukakan kepada mana-mana Pejabat Imigresen tiga (3) bulan 
sebelum tarikh tamat PL(KS) setelah mendapat kelulusan pemeriksaan kesihatan di Fomema Sdn. Bhd.  
 
20. Majikan bertanggungjawab menyimpan rekod pembayaran gaji PRA dan menunjukkan kepada pihak 
Jabatan apabila diminta untuk tujuan lanjutan PL(KS) atau Memo Periksa Keluar. Gaji PRA hendaklah 
dijelaskan selewat-lewatnya pada minggu terakhir setiap bulan.  
 
21. Rawatan perubatan perubatan PRA semasa dalam tempoh PL(KS) adalah di bawah tanggungjawab 
majikan.  
 
22. Majikan bertanggungjawab melaporkan kepada Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia sekiranya PRA meninggal 
dunia, hilang atau melarikan diri dari tempat sepatutnya dia bekerja.  
 
23. Majikan atau agensi pekerjaan tidak dibenarkan memukul atau apa-apa perbuatan yang mendatangkan 
kecederaan kepada PRA.  
 
24. Sekiranya majikan dan pasangannya bercerai, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia berhak untuk memindahkan 
nama majikan PRA berkenaan kepada isteri atau majikan baru yang berkelayakan.  
 
25. Sekiranya majikan atau pasangannya meninggal dunia, maka majikan atau pasangan atau warisnya 
diminta melaporkan kepada Jabatan Imigrsen Malaysia untuk tujuan pengesahan status majikan baru 
PRA berkenaan.  
 
26. Majikan hendaklah mendapatkan kelulusan dari Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia bagi PRA yang memohon 
berhenti atau diberhentikan atau tamat tempoh pas dengan mendapatkan Memo Periksa Keluar dari 
Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia bagi tujuan penghantaran pulang.  
 
27. Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia mempunyai hak membatalkan kelulusan pas yang dikeluarkan.  
 
28. Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia mempunyai kuasa memindahkan PRA yang dianiaya oleh majikan asal 
kepada majikan baru yang layak atas dasar kemanusiaan walaupun tanpa persetujuan majikan asal.  
 
29. Majikan yang ingin membawa pembantu rumah asing bekerja di luar negara dikehendaki 
memaklumkan kepada pejabat perwakilan negara asal pembantu rumah asing berkenaan di Malaysia.  
 
30. Majikan yang telah diberi kelulusan PRA tetapi gagal mematuhi syarat-syarat di atas akan 
disenaraihitamkan daripada mendapat kemudahan pembantu rumah asing.  
 
BAHAGIAN PEKERJA ASING  






IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENT OF MALAYSIA  
DIRECTIVES & PREREQUISITES FOR FOREIGN DOMESTIC WORKERS  
 
1. The Application for Temporary Work Permit (PL[KS]) for Foreign Domestic Workers is to be completed 
through an employment agency that is registered with the Immigraiton Department of Malaysia and 
submitted to a Malaysian Negeri/State Department of Immigration according to the employer’s address. 
 
2. The employer must ensure that the requied documentation for the permit application is in place  before 
making a formal pplication with the Negeri/State level Immigration Department.  
 
3. The employer must have a child not more than 15 years old or an ill parent requiring care and 
overseeing. 
 
4. The employer’s wife must work and only one domestic worker may be requested per family.  
 
5. The income of an employer who wises to compensate Fillipino and Sri Lankan domestic workers should 
be at least RM5,000.00 and for Indonesian, Thai and Cambodian domestic workers this sum should be 
at least RM3,000.00. 
 
6. Employers who are currently declared bankrupt may not hire a domestic worker. 
 
7. The employer may apply for an additional domestic worker only on special grounds as approved by the 
Immigration Department of Malaysia. 
 
8. The female domestic worker must come from only the following countries, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Cambodia, Philippines and Sri Lanka, and must be between the ages of 21 to 45. 
 
9. Only Muslim families can hire Muslim domestic workers.  
 
10. The prospective foreign domestic worker must remain in their home country and enter into Malaysia 
only after a Visa with Referral (VDR) has been successfully applied for and approved. 
 
11. The domestic worker must undergo a health examination within a month of arriving into Malaysia with 
Fomema Sdn. Bhd. So that the Immigration Department of Malaysia may fully endorse the Temporary 
Work Permit (PL[KS]).  
 
12. The domestic worker who does not fulfil the mandatory health checkup requirements will be sent home 
and the employer is responsible for the preparation of repatriation procedures including the application 
of an exit permit. 
 
13. The domestic worker may only perform housework duties within the employer’s stipulater address (with 
the exception of car washing, which is usually done outside the household).  
 
14. The domestic worker must be housed in appropriate living conditions that are accessible, provided with 
nutritious food and have at least 8 hours of rest everyday. 
 
15. The employer must be sensitive to Muslim domestic worker’s religious needs and allow her to pray 5 
times a day, to fast during the Ramadan period and to allow her to practice other religious activities. 
 
16. The domestic worker, whilst in Malaysia under the Temporary Work Permit is not allowed to become 
married to a citizen of this country during her stay here. 
 
17. The foreign domestic worker cannot apply for any other immigration entry permits while holding the 
Temporary Work Permit (PL[KS]).  
 
18. The foreign domestic worker cannot change jobs or employer without prior approval of the Immigration 




19. The health report from Fomema Sdn. Bhd must be filed to the immigration authorities 3 months before 
the expiry of the Temporary Work Permit PL(KS). 
 
20. The employer should maintain a record of wage payment details during the last week of every month 
and to furnish it upon request of the Immigration Department or when the domestic worker’s services 
are terminated. 
 
21. The employer is responsible for the paying of all medical bills incurred by the domestic worker. 
 
22. In the case of absence (running away), injury or death of the domestic worker, the employer must 
report it immediately to the Immigration Department of Malaysia. 
 
23. The employment agency and the employer must not hit or physically harm the domestic worker during 
her term here.  
 
24. Upon divorce, the domestic worker may be transferred to the wife or a third party. 
 
25. In the event both employers are dead, the next of kin must inform the Immigration Department of 
Malaysia, so that procedures to transfer the domestic worker may be effected. 
 
26. An Exit Permit is required for the termination of services or the resignation of the domestic worker and 
it should be submitted to the Immigration Department of Malaysia. 
 
27. The Immigration Department of Malaysia reserves the right to terminate any Temporary Work Permit. 
 
28. If the domestic worker is found to be abused or victimized under any circumstances, the Immigration 
Department of Malaysia may, on humanitarian grounds, transfer the domestic worker away without the 
prior approval of the current employer. 
 
29. Employers who wish to migrate must inform the respective embassies of the domestic worker’s home 
country so that repatriation procedures can be implemented.  
 
30. Any employer or domestic worker found to have breached these regulations may have their name 
blacklisted. 
 
FOREIGN WORKER SECTION 









PERAKUAN PENGAMBILAN  
PEMBANTU RUMAH ASING BERAGAMA ISLAM 
 
  
Saya ............................................................... pemegang kad pengenalan / pasport 
negara .................... nombor .......................... beralamat di ...................................  
...............................................................................................................................  
...............................................................................................................................  
dengan suci hati dan tanpa dipengaruhi oleh mana-mana pihak mengaku memahami isi 
kandungan Perjanjian Pekerjaan yang telah ditandatangani pada ................................  
di antara saya sebagai majikan berdaftar dan pembantu rumah asing (PRA) 
warganegara........................................ no. pasport ..................................  
Seterusnya saya mengaku akan menyediakan bilik penginapan khusus untuk PRA 
dan memberi kebenaran untuk PRA saya menunaikan ibadat wajib seperti 
sembahyang lima waktu setiap hari dan berpuasa di bulan Ramadhan. Saya 
juga mempastikan tiada sebarang gangguan ke atas PRA semasa beliau mengerjakan 
ibadat berkenaan.  
Saya juga mengaku tidak akan membenarkan PRA menguruskan kerja-kerja 
rumah yang haram dari segi Islam termasuklah menguruskan kerja berkaitan dengan 
anjing dan babi.  
Saya juga bersetuju untuk menghantar balik ke tempat asal PRA saya dengan 
kos yang akan ditanggung oleh saya setelah perkhidmatan beliau tamat atau ditamatkan 
oleh saya.  
 










Tandatangan  : .............................................  
Nama   : .............................................  
No. Kad Pengenalan  : .....................................  
Jawatan  : .............................................  Cop Rasmi Jabatan: ..................  
 
Pada .......................... haribulan .............................. 20 .............  
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            Appendix A 
 





I ______________________________________ owner of identification card/passport of 
country ____________________ number _________________ with the following home 
address __________________________________________ with all due honesty and 
without coercion from any party admit to understanding the contents of the Terms of 
Employment Contract that was signed on _____________________ between myself as 
a registered employer and my foreign domestic worker (PRA) from the following country 
______________________ with the passport number ___________________________.  
 
Following that, I hereby vow to prepare a bedroom solely for the use of my foreign 
domestic worker and to permit my foreign domestic worker to fulfill her religious 
obligations such as praying five times a day and fasting during the month of 
Ramadhan. I also vow ensure that my foreign domestic worker will not be disturbed at 
any instance when she is performing the above-mentioned religious obligations.  
 
I vow to not allow my foreign domestic worker to perform household chores that 
contradict with Islamic precepts such as handling dogs and pigs.  
 
I also vow to bear the cost of a flight ticket to my foreign domestic worker’s country of 
origin at the end of her working contract or upon the termination of her contract by 
myself.   
 
This contract has been signed with utmost honesty by myself on ______ (day) 















Identification card number: _____________________ 
Position: ___________________________ Official Stamp: __________________ 




          Lampiran B  
 
 
PERAKUAN PEMBANTU RUMAH ASING  
ISLAM WARGANEGARA ………………………. 
 
  
Saya .............................................................. pemegang pasport no. ........................  
Mengaku dengan suci hati dan tanpa dipengaruhi oleh mana-mana pihak bersetuju 





Nama majikan dan no. kad pengenalan/pasport  
Beragama : .................................................  
 







Saya bersetuju bahawa saya tidak akan membuat apa-apa tuntutan terhadap Kerajaan 
Malaysia atau wakilnya di dalam apa jua tindakan semasa berada di Malaysia.  
 
Sekian, pengakuan saya.  
 
Tandatangan : ................................................  
Nama PRA :  …………………………………………….  
 
Saksi dari Negara sumber  
NAMA PENUH  : ................................................  
ALAMAT  : ................................................  
................................................  
................................................ Cop Rasmi: .........................  
NO. TELEFON  : ................................................  
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             Annex B  
 




I __________________________________ holder of passport number 
_____________________ Vow with utmost honesty and without coercion from any 
















I agree to not file any claim towards the government of Malaysia or its representative in 
any way whatsoever during the term of my stay in Malaysia. 
 
Hereby, I vow. 
 
Signature:     ................................................  
Name of Foreign Domestic Worker:  …………………………………………….   
  
 
Witness from Country of Origin  
Full name:   ................................................  
Address:   ................................................  
     ................................................  
     ................................................  Official Stamp: .........................  






STANDARDISED CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
 
This contract is made on this ______ day of _________________ in the year ________ 
between ______________________________________________  I/C No. 
_____________________ of ___________________________  (hereinafter referred to 
as the Employer) of the one part and  _________________________________ Holder of 
_____________ Passport  No. ________________ of ___________________ 
(hereinafter referred to as  the Domestic Worker) of the other part.  
 
IT IS HEREBY AGREED as follows:  
 
 
1. Duration of the Contract  
 
(a) The Employer shall employ the Domestic Worker in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of this Contract and subject to the provisions of the 
relevant laws, regulations, rules, policies and  directives of Malaysia;  
 
(b) This Contract shall commence from the date of the arrival of the Domestic 
Worker at the Employer‟s home;  
 
(c) The Domestic Worker shall continue in the employment under the terms and 
conditions of this Contract for a period of ____________  ( _________ ) years 
or until such time the Contract in terminated in  accordance with the terms and 
conditions of this Contract.  
 
2. Place of work / residence of Domestic Worker  
 
The Domestic Worker shall work and reside only at 
___________________________________________________ during the 
duration of the Contract.  
 
3. Duties and Responsibilities of the Domestic Worker  
 
(a) The Domestic Worker shall work only with the Employer and shall not seek 
employment or be employed elsewhere;  
 
(b) The Domestic Worker shall comply with reasonable instructions of the 
Employer in the performance of the assigned household duties;  
 
(c) The Domestic Worker shall perform diligently, faithfully and sincerely all 
household duties assigned by the Employer which shall not include 




(d) The Domestic Worker shall not use or take advantage of the Employer‟s 
possessions without the Employer‟s permission;  
 
(e) The Domestic Worker is expected at all times observe proper attire and shall 
be courteous, polite and respectful to the Employer and family members of the 
Employer;  
 
(f) The Domestic Worker shall abide by the laws, rules, regulations, national 
policies and directive of Malaysia and respect the customs and traditions of 
Malaysia;  
 
(g) In the event that the Domestic Worker marries in Malaysia during the period 
of employment, the Government of Malaysia reserves the right to revoke the 
Work Pass;  
 
(h) No member of family or any other person shall be allowed to stay with the 
Domestic Worker in the place of employment without the consent of the 
Employer;  
 
4. Duties and responsibilities of the Employer  
 
(a) The Employer shall provide the Domestic Worker with reasonable 
accommodation and basic amenities;  
 
(b) The Employer shall provide the Domestic Worker reasonable and sufficient 
daily meals;  
 
(c) The Employer shall not require the Domestic Worker to work or to be engaged 
in any activities other than that related to household duties;  
 
(d) The. Employer shall insure the Domestic Worker with the Foreign Worker 
Compensation Scheme in respect of any medical expenses the Domestic 
Worker may incur in the event of any injury where such injury arises out of 
and in the course of employment;  
 
(e) The Employer shall at all times respect and pay due regard to the sensitivity of 
religious beliefs of the Domestic Worker, including the right to perform 
prayers and to refuse to handle and consume non-Halal food;  
 
5. Payment of Wages  
 
(a) The Employer shall pay the Domestic Worker a monthly wage of RM 
________ ( ______________________________  RINGGIT MALAYSIA) 




(b) No deduction of the monthly wages of the Domestic Worker shall be done 
save accordance with the law. 
 
6. Rest Period  
 
The Domestic Worker shall be allowed adequate rest.  
 
7. Termination of Contract by the Employer  
 
The Employer may terminate the service of the Domestic Worker without notice 
if the Domestic Worker commits any of misconduct inconsistent with the 
fulfillment of the Domestic Worker‟s duties or if the Domestic Worker breaches 
any of the terms and conditions of this contract.  
 
For the purposes of this clause, misconduct includes the following:  
 
(i) working with another employer;  
 
(ii) disobeying lawful and reasonable order of the Employer;  
 
(iii) neglecting the household duties and habitually late for work;  
 
(iv) is found guilty of fraud and dishonesty;  
 
(v) is involved in illegal and lawful activities;  
 
(vi) permitting outsiders to enter the Employer‟s premises or to use  the 
Employer‟s possessions without Employer‟s permission;  
 
(vii) using the Employer‟s possessions without the Employer‟s  permission.  
 
Provided always that the Employer terminating the Contract under this clause 
shall provide proof of existence of such situation upon request of the Domestic 
Worker.  
 
8. Termination of Contract by the Domestic Worker  
 
The Domestic Worker may terminate this contract without notice if:  
 
(i) The Domestic Worker has reasonable grounds to fear for his or her life or is 
threatened by violence or disease;  
 
(ii) The Domestic Worker is subjected to abuse or ill treatment by the Employer; 
or  
 




Provided always that the Domestic Worker terminating the Contract under this 
clause shall provide proof of existence of such situation upon request of the 
Employer.  
 
9. General Provisions 
 
(a) Transportation cost from the Domestic Worker‟s original exit point in 
______________________ to the place of employment shall be borne by the 
Employer.  
 
(b) In the event that the Contract is terminated by the Employer on the ground that 
the Domestic Worker has committed misconduct, the Domestic Worker shall 
bear the costs of his/her  repatriation.  
 
(c) The repatriation cost of the Domestic Worker from the place of employment to 
the original exit point in __________________ shall be borne by the 
Employer in the following circumstances:  
 
(1) at the completion of Contract of Employment;  
 
(2) termination of the Contract of Employment by the Employer; or  
 
(3) termination due to non-compliance of the terms and conditions of the 
Contract of Employment by the Employer.  
 
(d) Any dispute arising between the Employer and the Domestic Worker 
concerning the grounds for termination of the Contract of Employment 
pursuant to Paragraph 7 or 8 of this Contract shall be dealt with in accordance 
with the applicable laws in Malaysia.  
 
(e) For the purpose of this Contract, the terms “original exit point” shall mean, in 
_______________.  
 
10. Extension of the Contract  
 
Notwithstanding the expiry of the duration of the Contract, the Employer and the 
Domestic Worker may agree that this Contract may be extended based on similar 
terms and conditions therein.  
 
11. Time is Essence  
 
Time whenever mentioned shall be essence of this Contract in relation to all 





12. Governing Law  
 




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Contract have here on to affixed  










________________________     ________________________ 
 
Name:        Name:  








________________________     ________________________ 
Name:        Name:  
Date:         Date:  
 
 
*Note : A copy of this Contract must be submitted to the nearest Labour Department.  
 
 
 
 
 
